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Articles 
Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: 
The ABCs of Future Public Payments Law 
 
Mark Edwin Burge* 
As technology rolls out ongoing and competing streams of payments innovation, 
exemplified by Apple Pay (mobile payments) and Bitcoin (cryptocurrency), the law 
governing these payments appears hopelessly behind the curve. The patchwork of state, 
federal, and private legal rules seems more worthy of condemnation than emulation. This 
Article argues, however, that the legal and market developments of the last several 
decades in payment systems provide compelling evidence of the most realistic and socially 
beneficial future for payments law. The paradigm of a comprehensive public law 
regulatory scheme for payment systemsexemplified by Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform 
Commercial Codehas faded in relevance, while federal law has grown in a specialized 
consumer protection role. Meanwhile, private contract law has expanded to fill gaps 
where payment technology has exceeded the scope of public law.  
 
The evidence of the successes and failures of payments law in the face of rapid 
technological development shows that the field is not best governed by comprehensive 
public regulation on the Uniform Commercial Code model, but that public law still has 
an importantalbeit narrowerrole for the future. The most beneficial paradigm for 
governance of payment systems is a division between (1) private law handling systemic 
matters of operation, and (2) public law focused on protecting payment system end-users 
from oppression, fraud, and mistake. This demarcation of lawmaking responsibilities has 
the greatest track record of success and is the most capable of dealing with a foreseeable 
future of unforeseeable innovations.  
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Both this Article and its 
Author have benefitted greatly from Connell Alsup, Dan Barnhizer, Bryan Camp, Catherine 
Christopher, Erin Fonté, Bill Henning, Sally Henry, Julie Hill, Sarah Jane Hughes, Jason Korosec, 
Fred Miller, Peter Van Valkenburgh, Angela Walch, and Jane Winn for topical conversations, 
comments on sundry drafts, orin some instancesboth. Particular thanks go to Dean Andrew 
Morriss, Associate Dean for Faculty Research Huyen Pham, and Texas A&M University School of 
Law for providing substantial institutional support to the eclectic stream of research from which 
sprang this Article. Notwithstanding those debts of gratitude, however, the opinions expressed in this 
Article are entirely the responsibility of the Author. 
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Introduction 
A half-century ago, checks held an overwhelmingly dominant role in 
facilitating payments without cash.1 As recently as a decade ago, the 
status quo for an end-user making noncash payments in the United 
States could be summarized in two statements: (1) “No personal checks, 
please;” and (2) “Will that be debit or credit?”2 Paper checks were still 
important, but clearly in decline, and payment-by-plastic was ascendant 
in its chocolate-or-vanilla flavors. The world of cashless payments today 
is not so easily categorized. Mobile payment platforms like Apple Pay, 
Android Pay, and Samsung Pay seek to displace physical wallets.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., Personal Money Orders and Teller’s Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC, 85 Banking 
L.J. 95, 95 (1968) (asserting “the emergence of the personal check as the standard means for paying 
debts” in the post-World War II era). 
 2. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1373 (2004) (finding in 
the mid-2000s that “[c]redit cards present a significant socio-economic phenomenon.”); see also Mary 
Elizabeth Matthews, Credit CardsAuthorized and Unauthorized Use, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 233, 
233 (1994) (observing in the mid-1990s that the “use of credit cards has expanded so rapidly in the last 
few decades as to resemble a ‘plastic revolution.’”). 
 3. See, e.g., Erin F. Fonté, Mobile Payments in the United States: How Disintermediation May 
Affect Delivery of Payment Functions, Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering Issues, 8 Wash. 
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Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin seek to use digital tokens that not only 
displace cash, but also displace the role of banks and other financial 
institutions whose systems were once thought indispensable to noncash 
transactions.4 It is no exaggeration to say that the Internet and its 
associated technologies have changedand are continuing to 
changeeverything in the realm of payments. So, what is the most 
beneficial legal framework to deal with a foreseeable evolution of 
payments in the future? This Article seeks, and finds, an answer to that 
question out of both the successes and the wreckage of the past century 
of payments law. 
Payments law stands at an unusual juncture. One can rarely say that 
a field exists with “no law,” as the common law jurisprudential system 
prevents even the most exotic and unexpected developments from 
occurring in a legal vacuum. Payments law is no exception herecourts, 
regulators, and the general law of contracts will ultimately fill in legal 
gaps where they must, perhaps by analogizing to or stretching a previous 
generation of established law. A place where payments law is arguably 
special is in its current existence as a devolved patchwork of rules that 
have sprung up in place of a tightly planned comprehensive regime. 
Electronic payments now permeate business and commerce. The 
uninformed might accordingly think the signature legislative 
achievement in the field of commercial lawthe Uniform Commercial 
Code (“UCC”)would comprehensively address developing electronic 
payments, but as observers of the UCC know, it does not. The high-
water mark of the 1960s-era, state legislative enactments of UCC Articles 
3 and 4 created comprehensive governance in the field of commercial 
paper, including checks.5 This enactment has largely been followed by 
decades of declining significance, as private law has grown to dominate 
more recent payment technologies. 
Public law has grown in one particular area of payments, that of 
consumer protection, largely at the federal level, where the Truth in 
 
J.L. Tech. & Arts 419, 421 (2013) (“Mobile payments technology is poised to create a globally 
dramatic shift in how individuals pay for goods and services, track spending, and manage personal 
finances.”); M. MacRae Robinson, Note, Easing the Burden on Mobile Payments: Resolving Current 
Deficiencies in Money Transmitter Regulation, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 553, 553 (2014) (“The use of 
mobile payment systems is rapidly expanding both at home and abroad, replacing traditional forms of 
payment.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 
U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 53, 55 (2015) (“[C]ryptocurrencies are essentially protocols that allow for 
the validation of transactions without the need for a trusted third party such as a bank, credit card 
company, escrow agent, or recording agency.”). 
 5. See generally Henry Gabriel, The Revision of the Uniform Commercial CodeHow Successful 
Has It Been?, 52 Hastings L.J. 653, 654–55 (2001); Mark Edwin Burge, Too Clever by Half: Reflections 
on Perception, Legitimacy, and Choice of Law Under Revised Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 6 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 357, 360–61 (2015) (describing breadth of the original enactment of, 
and revisions to, the UCC generally). 
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Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act 
(“EFTA”) represent a different approach to payments regulation. These 
statutes eschew overarching codes in favor of targeted protections, such 
as the fifty dollar liability limit for credit cards6 and debit cards.7 The 
impact of this consumer-protective regime that facially imposes costs on 
the issuance of payment cards has been phenomenal growth for the 
industry.8 Consistent limitation of liability for fraudulent and erroneous 
card transactions has created an atmosphere in which payment cards are 
trusted more than they are feared. The cards accordingly have been 
empowered to displace inefficient paper checks in consumer practices. 
No card issuer could, by shifting fraud liability to its customers, harm 
other card issuers by inspiring fear and reticence in the marketplace, and 
the payment card system prospered as a result. The success of TILA and 
EFTA thus stands as a successful model for targeted end-user protection, 
and must be accounted for in mapping a future for payments law. 
Private contract law, in contrast, dominates the operational side of 
newer payment systems. Apart from TILA and EFTA, payment cards 
function through a web of private contracts, stretching from user to 
merchant with the card network in between. Increasing numbers of 
payments without card networks occur through banks via the automated 
clearing house (“ACH”) system. Collective self-governance through the 
National Automated Clearing House Association (“NACHA”)9 and its 
regional affiliates10 is a model of private law operated as a public-private 
partnership. The private rules of NACHA, in cooperation with the quasi-
public Federal Reserve System, have created a highly successful system 
of payments that, like payment cards before it, are also rapidly displacing 
checks.11 Every time a user receives a direct deposit paycheck or chooses 
to use online bill payment services through a bank, an ACH transaction 
has supplanted a check. Private law has been a tremendous success for 
electronic payment systems in handling the operational side of payments 
absent a comprehensive regulatory regime. If history is to hold any 
lessons for the future of payments, the legal paradigm must include a 
prominent place for private law. 
Payment systems now stand in an era where technological innovation 
in operations exceeds the regulatory capacity of public legal institutions. 
 
 6. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (West 2016). 
 7. See Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)(1) (West 2016). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 62–67; Fed. Reserve Sys., The 2013 Federal Reserve 
Payments Study: Recent and Long-Term Trends in the United States: 2000–2012 (2014). 
 9. See generally About NACHA, NACHA, The Elec. Payments Ass’n, https://www.nacha.org/ 
about (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (describing NACHA’s role in the payments industry). 
 10. See generally Regional Payments Associations, NACHA, The Elec. Payments Ass’n, https:// 
www.nacha.org/members/regional-payments-associations (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (providing guidance 
on how to join Regional Payments Associations). 
 11. Se infra text accompanying notes 145–150. 
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Public law protection of the end-user has nevertheless proven so successful 
and facilitated such industry growth12 that complete privatization of 
payments law is not the best response either. Legal inaction is not an 
attractive option as innovation is stretching the capacity of public law to 
function in areas of proven success. This Article argues that emerging 
payment systems should be subject to a division between private law and 
public law in which private law is predominant, but not exclusive. 
Part I of this Article considers the role of Articles 3 and 4 of the 
UCC as the ultimate regulatory embodiment of the common law of 
noncash payments, particularly in the checking system.13 Part II then 
establishes how the UCC’s high-water mark of comprehensive public 
regulation has eroded over a several-decade period coinciding with the 
rise of payment card networks and the ACH system. Both of these 
systems are predominantlybut not exclusivelygoverned by private 
contract law. This growth of private-law governance of payments has 
coincided with a general marginalization of the original UCC regime.14  
With this background established, Part III of this Article then 
considers two major strands of current innovation in payment systems: 
mobile payments and cryptocurrency.15 The Apple Pay exemplar of 
mobile payments illustrates the legal challenges arising from integration 
of a new payment system into a pre-existing public law framework that 
did not contemplate it. The Bitcoin exemplar of cryptocurrency shows a 
very different challenge for payments law, the establishment of a system 
that completely bypasses the previously unavoidable role of the banking 
system as the trusted intermediary for noncash payments. Part IV 
integrates lessons drawn from both payment systems history and recent 
developments to suggest a governing framework in which public law and 
private law are divided in a manner to maximize the overall socially-
beneficial effects.16 The Article concludes that the paradigm for 
governance of payment systems going forward should be a division 
between: (1) private law and public-private partnerships that handle 
systemic matters of operation; and (2) public law focused on protecting 
payment system end-users from oppression, fraud, and mistake. This 
general demarcation of lawmaking responsibilities has the greatest track 
record of success and is most capable of dealing with a foreseeable future 
of payments that is filled with unforeseeable innovations. 
 
 12. See Lewis Mandell, The Credit Card Industry: A History 69 (1990) (observing that by the 
end of the 1970s, a “wide array of laws and regulations” that protected consumers served the function 
of “stabilizing the industry,” priming it for subsequent growth). 
 13. See infra Part I and text accompanying notes 17–60. 
 14. See infra Part II and text accompanying notes 62–184. 
 15. See infra Part III and text accompanying notes 185–244. 
 16. See infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 245–278. 
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I.  The Uniform Commercial Code as the Payments Law Paradigm 
The weed-strewn landscape of payments law overall cannot be 
explained without reference to the comparatively manicured lawn 
occupied by Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC. Yet, as critics of the payment 
articles frequently note, this portion of the UCC was hardly innovative, 
arising as it did from a musty law of negotiable instruments dating back 
to Lord Mansfield’s day.17 The payment articles cannot even claim to be 
the first major attempt at codification of the common law of bills and 
notes, having been preceded by the turn-of-the-century Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Law. In a sense, the UCC payment articles 
represent not only themselves, but centuries of history. As a result, any 
understanding of the challenges to current payments law must include at 
least a thumbnail sketch of its foundations. 
Although the need for payments in commerce is as old as commerce 
itself, we can, as did Grant Gilmore, reasonably trace the present UCC 
law of checks to the last half of the eighteenth century.18 Commerce of 
the industrial revolution age required a means of payment that did not 
involve hauling around bags of metallic specie, and the solution 
developed by merchants and bankers was the bill of exchange, the 
instrument out of which bank checks developed.19 A bill of exchange was 
simply a written instruction by one person, perhaps a merchant, to an 
agent with whom the merchant had deposited money or credit.20 The 
money was payable upon presentation of the bill to the agent, but the bill 
could itself circulate in commerce.21 In international transactions, bills of 
exchange allowed the transfer of valuethe right to obtain payment 
from the agentdespite the existence of great distances and different 
national coinage, as the agent could ultimately pay the bill of exchange in 
the agent’s local currency.22 The UCC today uses the term “draft” to 
describe this kind of three-party financial instrument, and checks are 
 
 17. See, e.g., James Steven Rogers, The End of Negotiable Instruments: Bringing Payment 
Systems Law out of the Past 19 n. 1 (2012) (finding a “puzzling persistence” of the antiquated law of 
bills and notes in modern commerce); Neil B. Cohen, The Calamitous Law of Notes, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 
161, 161 (2007) (“The law of negotiable instruments is hemmed in on one side by its own antiquity and 
on the other by the emergence of electronic communications.”). 
 18. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 
448 (1979). 
 19. Id. at 447. 
 20. See Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 BYU L. 
Rev. 1169, 1170 n.5 (1998) (“The original negotiable instruments were ‘inland bills of exchange,’ 
typically issued by merchants, but the concept was extended to promissory notes by the end of the 
eighteenth century.”).  
 21. Id. 
 22. For a more detailed description of bills of exchange, which is beyond the scope of this Article, 
see Rogers, supra note 17, at 26–31. 
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accordingly a “draft” that is drawn upon a bank, which thus occupies the 
position of the merchant agent in the example above.23 
Although bills of exchange initially arose in international commerce, 
buyers and sellers in industrial England began using them in purely 
domestic transactions as well.24 As such bills never necessarily left the 
shores of Britain, they came to be known as inland bills of exchange. In 
1764, Lord Mansfield held these bills of exchange to be negotiable and 
thus capable of coming into possession of a “good faith purchaser” who 
took free of claimed defects in the underlying transaction.25 A good faith 
purchaser ultimately became known as a “holder in due course” under 
the English Bills of Exchange Act of 188226  As for checks as a species of 
commercial paper, they came into general use in England in 
approximately 1780.27 The English terminology eventually made its way 
across the Atlantic, such that American courts used it as well. For 
example, the Michigan Supreme Court explained in an 1889 criminal case 
involving the forged indorsement of a check that, “[a]ll checks come within 
the meaning and definition of a bill of exchange, but all bills of exchange 
are not checks. . . . They are commercial paper, and are governed by the 
same rules as to presentment and notice of non-payment as inland bills of 
exchange . . . .”28 The characteristics separating a check from other bills of 
exchange were that it was drawn on a bank and was payable to the bearer 
on demand.29 The fact that checks are a species of the inland bill of 
exchange has been declared by no less an authority than the U.S. Supreme 
Court,30 albeit in the pre-Erie days where it actually heard cases of 
domestic commercial law.31 
 
 23. See U.C.C. § 3-104(e) & (f) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (defining “draft” and 
“check” respectively). 
 24. See generally Frederick K. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early 
English Law, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1938) (discussing the origin and development of early English law 
governing negotiable paper).  
 25. Grant v. Vaughan (1764) 96 Eng. Rep. 281 (K.B.); see M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of 
Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. Tol. L. Rev. 625, 632–33 (1990) 
(describing Lord Mansfield’s application of the 1704 Statute of Anne in the Grant case). 
 26. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 449 n.14. 
 27. Henry J. Bailey & Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks: The Law of Bank 
Checks ¶ 1.1 (7th ed. 1992). 
 28. People v. Kemp, 76 Mich. 410, 416 (1889); see Merchants’ Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. 604, 
647 (1870) (“Bank checks are not inland bills of exchange, but have many of the properties of such 
commercial paper; and many of the rules of the law merchant are alike applicable to both.”). 
 29. Bailey & Hagedorn, supra note 27, at ¶ 1.1. 
 30. Rogers v. Durant, 140 U.S. 298, 303 (1891) (“According to all the text writers on bills and 
notes, as well as in numerous decisions, a check is denominated a species of inland bill of exchange, 
not with all the incidents of an ordinary bill of exchange . . . .”) (quoting approvingly Moses v. Franklin 
Bank, 34 Md. 574 (1871)). 
 31. J. Benton Hurst, De Facto Supremacy: Supreme Court Control of State Commercial Law, 98 Va. 
L. Rev. 691, 693 (2012) (noting that a pre-1938 “willingness of state courts to follow the Supreme Court 
on questions of commercial law created a de facto supremacy for the Supreme Court, even where it could 
not directly review cases.”); see William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the 
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The late 1700s were thus the era in which “the courts, English and 
American, put together, in not much more than half a century, the law of 
negotiable instruments almost exactly as we know it today.”32 Under the 
English common law as developed in the late 1700s, “private negotiable 
instruments were legally recognized and thus became more widely used 
by ordinary people.”33 On the eve of the twentieth century, the law of 
negotiable instruments stood much as it does now. Eighteenth century 
concepts34such as indorsements and allongesremain in the UCC law 
of checking to this very day.35 
Despite its common law pedigree, the law of checks and other 
negotiable instruments also has the distinction of being the first major 
success at being moved out of the common law through codification by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.36 
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (“NIL”) was promulgated by 
the Commission in 1896.37 The NIL was heavily influenced by the English 
Bills of Exchange Act, as the lead drafter, attorney J.J. Crawford of New 
York City, had a mandate from the Commission to follow the English 
statute “as much as he thought it applicable to American conditions.”38 
The NIL was also notable for its more expansive unification of 
commercial paper on the rubric of “negotiable instruments,” and on that 
count seems to have drawn on an 1876 codification in California.39 By 
 
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1513 (1984) 
(recounting that in 1842 “the Supreme Court held in Swift v. Tyson that it was not bound . . . to follow 
state court decisions on matters of general commercial law.”). Swift, interestingly, was a case involving 
the law of negotiable instruments. See id. at 1514 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)). 
 32. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 448. 
 33. Alvin C. Harrell, Book Review and Commentary: James Steven Rogers, the End of Negotiable 
Instruments, 66 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 220, 222 (2012). 
 34. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 448 n.13 (citing Peacock v. Rhodes (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 402, 402 
(K.B.) and Robertson v. Kensington, 128 Eng. Rep. 238, 239 (Ex. 1811)). 
 35. See U.C.C. § 3-204(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (defining “indorsement” 
and, in consideration of the possibility of signatures placed on an allonge, providing that “a paper 
affixed to the instrument is part of the instrument”); see also Sinclair, supra note 25, at 676 (criticizing 
the 1990 revision of Article 3 because it “would be more in accord with present realities to have 
allowed for indorsements on paper only loosely attached, or separable allonges, provided that there is 
no doubt as to the chain of title.”). 
 36. In 2006, NCCUSL amended its constitution to provide that it may also be known as the 
“Uniform Law Commission” or “ULC.” Robert A. Stein, Forming a More Perfect Union: A 
History of the Uniform Law Commission 20–21 (2013). For consistency’s sake, this Article will tend 
to refer to NCCUSL and the ULC simply as “the Commission,” unless context requires otherwise. 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. Frederick K. Beutel, The Development of State Statutes on Negotiable Paper Prior to the 
Negotiable Instruments Law, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 836, 852 (1940); see Stein, supra note 36, at 9. 
 39. Beutel, supra note 38, at 851; see William E. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and 
Notes (2d ed. 1961) (“The Conference had as its model [for the NIL] the English Bills of Exchange 
Act. This Act deals only with the law of bills of exchange, with separate sections dealing with 
promissory notes and checks. The draftsmen of the American Act departed from this policy and 
drafted an act applicable to negotiable instruments generally.”). 
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1924, the NIL had the distinction of having been adopted by every 
American state,40 a first for the uniform laws drafting process.41 The NIL 
provisions on bank checks, however, trace back to the 1882 English Act, 
and ultimately to the same needs of commerce that Lord Mansfield 
sought to address in the mid-1700s.42 
The 1940s began with the NIL in a position of overwhelming 
legislative acceptance, but in the midst of dissatisfaction with the state of 
commercial law as a whole.43 Between 1906 and 1908, the Commission 
had promulgated several other commercial statutes, such as the Uniform 
Sales Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act, all of which achieved widespread adoption.44 Many thought 
that provisions of these acts “had become, if not obsolete, at least not 
suitable to govern the business practices of the day.”45 With that 
perspective, Commission President William Schnader proposed the 
creation of a comprehensive commercial code in his 1940 address.46 At 
first, that project advanced largely as a function of Karl Llewellyn’s 
existing effort at drafting a Revised Uniform Sales Actthe genesis of 
what became UCC Article 2.47 The project gained heft and momentum 
after 1944, when the American Law Institute (“ALI”) signed a formal 
agreement with the Commission to prepare the UCC as a joint 
undertaking.48 The “real work” on organization and drafting began on 
January 1, 1945, with Karl Llewellyn at the helm as Chief Reporter.49 
The initial promulgated version of the UCC came about in late 
1951,50 but Article 4, concerning bank deposits and collections, almost did 
not make the cut. In May 1951, the ALI decided to eliminate Article 4. 
President Schnader, who was also an original drafting committee 
 
 40. William E. Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and 
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 153–54 (1953). 
 41. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 2 (1967); Stein, supra note 36, at 9. 
 42. Cf. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 448 (“Indeed anyone who has mastered the current American 
formulation of . . . Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code will have a startling sense of déjà vuI 
suppose this is déjà vu in reverseif he then goes back to the mid-nineteenth century treatises[.]”); 
Britton, supra note 39, at 13 (“[T]he law with respect to bills and notes was essentially the common 
law found in the decisions of English Courts from 1600 to the date of enactment of the English Bills of 
Exchange Act in 1882 and in the decisions of the state and federal courts of the United States.”). 
 43. See generally Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
58 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 799 (1958) (describing the legislative history and drafting of the UCC). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Schnader, supra note 41, at 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-
49, 51 S.M.U. L. Rev. 275, 299–313 (1998) (describing progress of the 1941–44 drafts of the Revised 
Uniform Sales Act). 
 48. Id. at 313; Schnader, supra note 41, at 3. 
 49. Schnader, supra note 41, at 5. 
 50. Id. at 7. 
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member, later attributed the saving of Article 4 to an eleventh hour 
rewrite and lobbying efforts by Walter Malcolm, “one of the nation’s 
outstanding bank lawyers” and also Chair of the American Bar 
Association Committee on the Commercial Code.51 Not everyone was so 
complimentary of the product produced by a lawyer for banking interests. 
Critics ranged from prominent negotiable instruments scholar Frederick 
Beutelwho declared that the entire UCC should be rejected52to 
Article 9 architect Grant Gilmore, who wrote a vigorous defense of the 
UCC as a whole in the Yale Law Journal, but simultaneously admitted he 
would be happy to see Article 4 dropped.53 Gilmore later analogized the 
entrusting of Article 4 to a committee of bank counsel “as tantamount to 
appointing a committee of dogs to draw up a protective ordinance for 
cats.”54 Critics of Article 4 have also criticized it as nothing more than a 
“refurbished version of the Bank Collection Code,”55 a statute drafted by 
the American Bankers Association that was relatively unsuccessful in 
achieving enactment, at least in comparison to the NIL.56 
A principal point of contention regarding Article 4 was an issue that 
looms large today: Where should the divide be between flexible, but 
open to abuse, private law, and rigid, but intentionally protective, public 
law? The banking and business interests favored private law57 and 
“freedom of contract,”58 and UCC section 4-103, as ultimately adopted, 
did as well, with the effect that private law supplanted public regulation 
far more than many wanted. To this very day, Article 4 reflects a 
significant role for private law59 even in the midst of a comprehensive 
public law structure: 
  
 
 51. Id.  
 52. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 
61 Yale L.J. 334, 363 (1952) (“The existence of Article 4 alone is enough to condemn in its entirety 
the adoption of [the Uniform Commercial Code].”). 
 53. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J. 
364, 374 (1952) (“While I do not agree with many of the details of Beutel’s criticism of Article 4, I do 
not care to urge enactment of the present text of the Article.”). 
 54. Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 Buff. 
L. Rev. 359, 452 (2001) (quoting Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980)). 
 55. Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 Ala. L. 
Rev. 551, 555 (1991). 
 56. Id. at 553 (observing that the pre-UCC Bank Collection Code “did not meet with a positive 
reception, for the most part . . . .”). 
 57. Kamp supra, note 54, at 406–11 (describing debates in the UCC drafting process over whether 
its statutory terms should be predominantly mandatory or predominantly permissive). 
 58. Id. at 453 (quoting Walter Malcom). 
 59. Accord Gregory E. Maggs, A Complaint About Payment Law Under the U.C.C.: What You 
See Is Often Not What You Get, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 201, 211 (2007) (observing that some UCC rules “do 
not apply because the parties routinely waive them by contract.”). 
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The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement 
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank’s responsibility for its 
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the 
measure of damages for the lack or failure; but the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to be 
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.60 
Section 4-103 of the UCC also, by political and practical necessity, 
contained concession to public regulation at the federal level. Regulations 
and operating circulars of the Federal Reserve also supersede provisions of 
Article 4.61 The 1951 redraft of Article 4 was accepted, but its near-death 
experience and the aftermath were a harbinger of structural difficulties still 
to come. For the most part, Article 3 did not arouse widespread feelings 
for or against it,62 though it admittedly was caught up in criticism of the 
UCC as a whole. 
The ultimate enactment of Articles 3 and 4 was more of a triumph 
for continuity than for reform. Payments by check were subject to 
statutory regulation, but the regulation was on terms acceptable to the 
bankers in the business of collecting checks, so long as such terms were 
acquiesced to by the Federal Reserve System.63 Despite disagreement on 
particular nuances as against its predecessors, the UCC in fact “went to 
great lengths to recreate and codify the earlier Negotiable Instruments 
Law and Bank Collections Code.”64 
By 1967, all articles of the UCC had been enacted in forty-nine 
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.65 The fiftieth 
state, civil law Louisiana, ultimately adopted parts of the UCC, including 
the payment articles.66 Despite the hints shown during the Article 4 
controversies over the role of private contract, the future looked bright 
for the existence and growth of payments law as public law at the state 
level. Lord Mansfield’s negotiable instruments system was intact, with 
the bank check as the lineal descendant of the original three-party inland 
 
 60. U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. § 4-103(b)–(c). 
 62. See, e.g., Britton, supra note 40, at 171 (“Some changes [from the NIL to UCC Article 3] are 
thought to be improvements and some are thought not to be. But whichever of two competing rules is 
in force will make little or no difference to the man in the street and, for that matter, little difference 
even to bankers.”). 
 63. Henry J. Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and 
Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 409, 413 (1993) (observing that UCC 
section 3-102(c) adds a provision that Federal Reserve Regulations and Federal Reserve Bank 
operating circulars govern any inconsistent Article 3 provision). 
 64. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and 
the Race to the Bottom, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 569, 571 n.5 (1998). 
 65. Schnader, supra note 41, at 9–10; Burge, supra note 5, at 360–61 (describing successes in the 
original enactment of and revisions to the UCC). 
 66. Agustín Parise, A Constant Give and Take: Tracing Legal Borrowings in the Louisiana Civil 
Law Experience, 35 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1, 29 (2010) (recounting “the gradual adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in Louisiana, with the exception of articles 2 (sales) and 6 (bulk sales).”). 
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bill of exchange.67 Looks can be deceiving, however. Electronics, plastic, 
and institutional inertia were already setting the stage to marginalize the 
UCC paradigm for governing payments. 
II.  The Long, Inconsistent Decline of Public Payments Law 
Following the late-1960s triumph of the UCC in state legislatures, 
one might have believed that the future governance of payment 
transactions rested securely in comprehensive state law. Yet even in an 
era dominated by checks for noncash payments, innovations were 
already afoot outside of the known and settled legal framework. “In most 
fields of law,” James Rogers has observed, “developments of that sort 
would be reflected by changes or additions to the basic structure of the 
legal rules. Payment systems law has been different.”68 Indeed it has. The 
new noncash systems for payment arose in comparative disregard of the 
legal milieu of the UCC. While payment cards and automated clearing 
house payments have been impacted by public law, the outstanding 
commonality of these innovations was and remains the dominant role of 
private law, particularly the law of assent to contractual obligations. 
A. Payment Cards and Private Contracts 
The shift in noncash payments away from checks since the dawn of the 
twenty-first century has been dramatic, as statistics from the 2013 Federal 
Reserve Payments Study demonstrate.69 In 2000, 41.9 billion checks were 
paid in the United States, accounting for a solid fifty-eight percent of all 
noncash payments.70 By 2012, the number of paid checks had declined to 
18.3 billion, representing only fifteen percent of noncash payments.71 The 
overwhelming majority of the lost check volume in that twelve-year period 
is attributable to increased use of credit cards and debit cards. Back in 
2000, these two types of payment cards accounted for 21.7 billion 
paymentsroughly one-third of all noncash payments in the United States.72 
For 2012, credit and debit card use collectively had ballooned to 73.2 billion 
payments, that constituted fifty-nine percent of all noncash payments in the 
country.73 Credit and debit cards today thus occupy the majority payment 
systems role held by checks as little as fifteen years ago. 
 
 67. See Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 Geo. L.J. 633, 
641 (2005) (“The negotiable instrument, of course, has been superseded by . . . its main surviving 
descendant, the check . . . .”). 
 68. Rogers, supra note 17, at xiv. 
 69. Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 8, at 16. 
 70. Id. at 15. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 7. Most of the remaining noncash payments unaccounted for in this summary were by 
automated clearinghouse (“ACH”), a payment system discussed at more length later in this Article. 
See infra Part II.B. 
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This transition away from checks did not occur overnight. Private-
issue credit cardsa mechanism by which retailers extended credit to 
their customersdate back to the early twentieth century, as the cards 
were issued by hotels, large department stores, and gas station chains.74 
As is true with such cards today, they could be used only with the issuing 
retailer, and thus represented more of a form of revolving customer 
credit than a payment system. Most trace the creation of the third-party 
universal credit card to Diners Club in 1949, which developed a network 
of travel and entertainment retailers who accepted the card for 
payment.75 The typical end-user was “the salesman who could charge 
meals at restaurants while entertaining clients on the road.”76 Traveler’s 
check giant American Express entered the universal card market in 1958, 
as did a number of large banks, including California-based Bank of 
America. Its “BankAmericard” was able to expand greatly outside of its 
California home in the mid-1960s with a licensing structure allowing 
other banks to issue the branded card.77 With widespread branding and 
merchant acceptance, a card issued by a network of banks could achieve 
much greater market penetration with merchants and end-users than 
could a single bank’s card, as attested to by the failure of bank credit 
cards in the 1960s, when even the enormous Chase Manhattan folded its 
operations.78 Following shortly behind Bank of America’s expansion, a 
group of large banksgenerally centered more in the eastern half of the 
countryformed the Interbank Card Association, thus creating a second 
large, multibank card network built around the “Master Charge” card.79 
Bank Americard changed its name to Visa in 1976 “to develop a more 
international image” that was not tied to the name of a particular bank.80 
Master Charge followed suit in 1980, changing its name to MasterCard.81 
While Visa and MasterCard grew on the credit-issuing side of the 
market, American Express came to eclipse Diners Club in the travel-
and-entertainment (“T&E”) charge card market. Today, the distinction 
between corporate T&E charge card brands (like American Express) and 
general-purpose credit cards (like MasterCard and Visa) has faded, with 
American Express crossing over into the general use and credit market 
while MasterCard and Visa have cultivated corporate accounts.82 The last 
 
 74. Gillian Garcia, Credit Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6 J. Consumer Res. 327, 327 (1980). 
 75. Mandell, supra note 12, at xiii. 
 76. Id. at xiv. 
 77. Eric E. Bergsten, Credit CardsA Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. 
Rev. 485, 486 n.3 (1967). 
 78. Mandell, supra note 12, at xiv. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at xv. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment 
Systems, 12 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 425, 430 (2007) (“American Express and Discover are independent 
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of today’s four major American payment card brandsDiscoverwas 
launched by Sears in 1986.83 Discover sought a general use customer base 
like MasterCard and Visa, but like American Express, began as a direct-
issue card rather than a brand licensed through banks.84 
General purpose payment card transactions are thus typically 
conducted through one of the four major card networks: MasterCard, 
Visa, American Express, and Discover.85 The networks are functionally 
either open or closed. MasterCard and Visa are the prototypical open 
networks, allowing many banks to participate as card issuers if they 
contract to license the brand.86 American Express and Discover, in 
contrast, began life as closed card networks, cutting out the licensing 
banks, though today they also operate open networks on the MasterCard 
and Visa model.87 In an open network purchase transaction, one bank 
acts as the card issuer to the buyer, while another bank acts as the 
acquirerthe seller’s bank that processes payments for that seller.88 In a 
consumer transaction with a merchant, for example, the issuer bank 
transfers funds to the acquirer bank. The merchant can then access the 
funds at the acquirer bank, and the consumer receives a bill from the 
issuer bank for the transferred funds.89 Banks issuing branded cards and 
processing merchant payments may act as either the issuer or acquirer in 
a given card transaction, conceivably even acting as both.90 In the middle 
of the transactionbetween the issuer bank and the acquirer bankis 
the card network. In a closed payment network, such as American 
Express and Discover, the card issuer is also the merchant acquirer and 
also operates the card network.91 
The card networks are, of course, not providing their services for 
free. The most visible cost to the end-user of a credit card is interest 
 
financial institutions, which both traditionally performed all three roles: issuer, acquirer, and network 
itself. Recently, these networks began to allow other banks to issue cards with their brands, and 
Discover has also begun to outsource its acquirer functions.”). 
 83. Mandell, supra note 12, at xxii. 
 84. See generally Our History, Discover Fin. Servs., https://www.discover.com/company/our-company/ 
our-history/ (providing a timeline of major developments since the first issuance of a Discover card in the 
mid-1980s). 
 85. Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, 
and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 265, 275 (2005). 
 86. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: 
Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 393, 424 (2005) (“An open system is a 
payment system where an association or third-party company maintains a contractual relationship with 
both the card issuer and the merchant acquirer . . . . Open systems include associations such as VISA 
and MasterCard.”). 
 87. Id. at 425 (“Closed systems include programs such as department store cards, American 
Express, and Discover.”). 
 88. Levitin, supra note 85, at 275. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 276. 
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accruing on a carried balance, but that profit goes to the card issuing 
bank, which took on the risk of extending credit to an end-user who 
might default. On the acquirer side of the transaction, however, the 
source of profit is the merchant discount. For example, on a card 
purchase of $100, the merchant will only receive between $97 and 
$98.50.92 The remaining $1.50 to three dollars is ultimately split between 
the acquirer and the interchange fee charged by one of the open card 
networks. In the case of a closed network, the entire discount amount 
goes to the acquirer. For merchants, certainty of prompt payment and 
customer convenience are the largest incentives for them to accept 
payment cards and less than 100 cents on the dollar.93 
The same networks built to handle credit card transactions can also 
handle debit card transactions. The payment experience for the 
merchantfast payment certainty in exchange for accepting the merchant 
discountis largely the same as for a credit card, though the amount and 
allocation of interchange fees has been a point of contention.94 The 
original debit cards were issued by regional automated teller machine 
(“ATM”) networks in the late 1970s, adding point-of-sale functionality to 
their initial ability to withdraw cash at ATMs.95 From the end-user’s 
perspective, the main distinction between debit and credit is the source 
of payment, with the former being a direct withdrawal from the user’s 
bank account instead of an extension of credit on an open account. 
Unlike twentieth century bank checks, which came into being with 
both the benefit and burden of centuries of the public law of negotiable 
instruments behind them, payment cards began life exclusively as 
creatures of private contract. For example, a 1967 survey of cases on the 
apportionment of liability between credit card issuers and cardholders for 
unauthorized use carried an enormous caveat about drawing conclusions 
from the cases: “Because of this reliance on private agreement rather than 
public law, any analysis of the reported decisions must be made in light of 
the type of agreement involved in each case.”96 In particular, analogy to 
the public law of negotiable instruments was wholly inapt.97 
Growth in the use of credit cards eventually piqued the interest of 
Congress, resulting in federal public law on point, but not a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme. The 1970 amendments to TILA upended some parts of 
the existing web of contracts by shifting liability for fraud losses from the 
 
 92. Cf. Morriss & Korosec, supra note 86, at 421 (“[T]ypical merchant acquirers in the United 
States charge merchants a discount rate of between 1.5% and 3% of the purchase price.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. David A. Balto, Creating a Payment System Network: The Tie That Binds or an Honorable 
Peace?, 55 Bus. Law. 1391, 1392 (2000). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Bergsten, supra note 77, at 488 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 488–89 (citing Lit Bros. v. Haines, 121 A. 131 (N.J. 1923)). 
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cardholder to the card issuer.98 The amended TILA, as is still the law 
today, limited the liability of a cardholder for unauthorized use to fifty 
dollars.99 The protective definition of “unauthorized use” covers “use of a 
credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have 
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the 
cardholder receives no benefit.”100 
TILA further required the card issuer to notify the cardholder of the 
potential liability,101 to provide the cardholder a means of notifying the 
issuer of loss or theft of the card,102 and to provide the cardholder a 
security method for identifying the user as the person authorized to use 
the card.103 It also imposed procedural protections on card issuance, such 
as by prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited credit cards.104 These changes, 
while significant in their own right, also represented a new trend in 
payments lawnon-comprehensive federal intervention. The TILA is 
largely a consumer protection statute, as it does not apply to “[c]redit 
transactions involving extensions of credit primarily for business, 
commercial, or agricultural purposes, or to government . . . or to 
organizations.”105 Regulation Z, implementing the TILA,106 likewise 
affirms that this body of law is not all-encompassing governance of the 
type that UCC Articles 3 and 4 attempt to provide for checks.107 The 
targeted consumer protection role of TILA and Regulation Z has existed 
for decades, but the focus became clearer with the passage of the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, as it 
transferred authority over Regulation Z from the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System to the newly established Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection.108 
The TILA also creates a right for credit card holders that, while 
properly characterized as a consumer protection right, has nothing to do 
with protection within the payment system itself. Within certain 
limitations, TILA makes a credit card issuer “subject to all claims (other 
than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the 
 
 98. Matthews, supra note 2, at 249–50. 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (West 2012). 
 100. Id. § 1602(o). 
 101. Id. § 1643(a)(1)(C). 
 102. Id. § 1643(a)(1)(D). 
 103. Id. § 1643(a)(1)(F); see Matthews, supra note 2, at 250. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (West 2012) (“No credit card shall be issued except in response to a request 
or application therefor.”). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1). 
 106. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2014). 
 107. See generally Id. § 1026.3 (listing transactions that are exempt from Regulation Z). 
 108. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (mandating reform in the American financial regulatory environment); see also 
12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2014). 
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credit card is used as a method of payment.”109 The consumer user of a 
credit card thus has a right to withhold payment on a charge that is the 
basis of an unresolved dispute with the merchant who charged the credit 
account.110 Note that the right to withhold payment arises from a dispute 
in an underlying purchase transaction, and not from a problem with the 
card issuer or the payment network. In effect, the payment network is 
here being used for a nonpayment purposeto shift the general balance 
of power away from merchants and toward consumers by granting 
consumers a self-help remedy that would not exist apart from the use of 
a credit card. The payment card networks have adapted to this 
requirement by operating chargeback systems by which transactions can 
be reversed and the price charged back to the seller (through its 
merchant acquirer) and credited to the consumer’s account through the 
network.111 None of this activity resolves the actual merchant-consumer 
dispute, but it changes who gets to hold the money pending resolution. In 
a small-value claim, the consumer may win by default. 
TILA provided protections for consumers, but only for consumers 
using payment cards for extensions of creditnamely, credit card users112 
The defining feature of a debit card, in contrast, is that it does  not 
involve an extension of credit.113 The card is instead a means by which the 
end-user can spend her own money. In the face of growth of consumer 
ATM transactions and the small-but-growing consumer use of other 
electronic means to transfer money, the 1978 Congress passed the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”).114 The EFTA is effective 
where there is “a card, code, or other means of access to a consumer’s 
account for the purpose of initiating electronic fund transfers,” and 
covers, among other things, ATM cards and general use debit cards.115 
The regulations implementing the EFTA, known as Regulation E, were 
originally promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, butjust as 
occurred with TILA and Regulation Zauthority for implementing the 
EFTA was transferred to the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
 
 109. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(a) (West 2012). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer 
Protection Policy, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 520, 534–35 (2006). 
 112. David Smith & Gregg Stevens, The Impact of TILA on the Debtor-Creditor Relationship, 61 
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 296, 307 (2007) (“Of course, the TILA applies only to credit transactions 
entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”). 
 113. Rosenberg, supra note 111, at 520 (describing debit cards as “payment cards that do not 
require consumers to qualify for credit”). 
 114. See generally Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-630, Title XX, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (West 2010)). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(1) (West 2010) (defining “accepted card or other means of access”). 
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Protection Act.116 Like its older TILA sibling, the EFTA is fundamentally 
a consumer protection statute that does not on its face apply to electronic 
funds transfers by businesses.117 
The EFTA and Regulation E govern the issuance and operation of 
electronic funds transfer “access devices” like debit cards.118 The law also 
limits the liability of consumers for unauthorized electronic funds 
transfers, thus placing the risk of excess liability on the issuer of the debit 
card or other access device. Consumers who notify the issuer within two 
business days of learning of the loss or theft of their device have their 
liability capped at fifty dollars, thus matching the TILA limit for credit 
cards.119 Unlike the credit card limit, however, the EFTA contains two 
additional tiers of potential consumer liability.120 A consumer who fails to 
notify the issuer within two business days faces an increased liability limit 
of $500.121 Beyond that, a consumer faces unlimited liability for use 
beginning sixty days after a statement of account showing the original 
unauthorized use, if such losses would not have occurred “but for” the 
consumers failure to contact her financial institution.122 In many 
circumstances, the $500 and unlimited tiers of liability cannot occur 
because of greater customer protections in her contract with the bank. 
As banks have sought to promote the use of debit cards in lieu of paper 
checks, many contractually capped customer liability at fifty dollars.123 
Contractually providing for zero liability for unauthorized use is also a 
practice that evens the legal playing field between debit and credit 
cards.124 Such a system allows the banks issuing debit cards to state, 
relatively truthfully, that their customers’ accounts are no more at risk 
 
 116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111–203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (transferring authority to the CFPB in section 1011). 
 117. C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability 
Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1143, 1170 (1996) (describing both the 
EFTA and TILA as “consumer-protection statutes”). 
 118. 12 C.F.R. § 1005.4–1005.8 (2015). 
 119. Id. § 1005.6(b)(2). 
 120. See generally Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition between 
Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 675, 688 (1999) (“In 
marked contrast to the flat $50 limit on consumer liability under Regulation Z, Regulation E 
contemplates that a consumer who completely fails to notify a financial institution after losing the card 
may be exposed to losses without any statutory cap.”). 
 121. 12 C.F.R. § 1005.6(b)(2) (2015). 
 122. Id. § 1005.6(b)(3). 
 123. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 70 (6th ed. 2016). 
 124. See, e.g., Visa Debit/Check Card FAQ, Visa, https://www.visa.com/chip/personal/security/zero-
liability.jsp (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“Visa’s Zero Liability Policy is our guarantee that you won’t be held 
responsible for unauthorized charges made with your account or account information. You’re protected if 
your Visa credit or debit card is lost, stolen or fraudulently used, online or offline.” (footnote omitted)).  
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using a debit card with direct access to their bank accounts than they 
would be using a completely unconnected credit card.125 
In the decades since enactment of the TILA and EFTA payment card 
provisions, the payments law under these statutes has been relatively 
stable, but with one substantial exception on the credit side. In 2009, 
Congress enacted the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Disclosure Act (“CARD Act”).126 The CARD Actlike the provisions of 
its TILA predecessoraimed squarely at consumer protection by 
reigning in certain terms in issuer-consumer credit card contracts. The 
CARD Act placed limits on the timing and ability of issuers to increase 
interest rates.127 It also mandated a variety of plain language disclosures128 
and restricted the means and method by which card issuers could enroll 
younger adults, like college students.129 The general goal of the CARD 
Act was to empower consumer decision making through information and 
by increasing the number of avenues where consumers could exercise 
that decisionmaking ability.130 
The rise and widespread success of payment cards and their 
networks, generally to the detriment of checks, demonstrated beyond all 
doubt that a robust payment system can exist absent a comprehensive 
public law scheme. The payment card systems are instead built on a 
collection of private contracts, including those between card issuers and 
users, card issuers and the card network, the card network and merchant-
bank acquirers, and acquirers and their accepting merchants. Yet, this 
system dominated by private law hasperhaps as an unwitting cost to 
sustaining operational private governancelived with consumer protection 
law at the federal level for several decades. The TILA (affecting credit 
cards) and the EFTA (affecting debit cards) have taken many of the rough 
edges off the victimization of card users by oppression, fraud, and mistake. 
The success of this approach, while certainly not a success of the 
 
 125. See, e.g., Zero Liability Protection, MasterCard, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/about-
mastercard/what-we-do/terms-of-use/zero-liability-terms-conditions.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“As 
a MasterCard cardholder, Zero Liability applies to your purchases made in the store, over the telephone, 
online, or via a mobile device and ATM transactions. As a cardholder, you will not be held responsible 
for unauthorized transactions . . . .”). 
 126. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1734 (2010). 
 127. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i) (West 2016) (“Advance notice of rate increase and other charges 
required”); 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1 (West 2016) (“Limits on interest rate, fee, and finance charge increases 
applicable to outstanding balances”). 
 128. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a) (West 2016) (“Disclosure requirements for open end consumer 
credit plans secured by consumer’s principal dwelling”); 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (West 2016) (“Required 
disclosures by creditor”). 
 129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(r) (West 2016) (“College card agreements”). 
 130. Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and the Uneasy Case for 
Disclosure, 127 Banking L.J. 924, 925 (2010) (“[T]he CARD Act also contains an array of features 
that can be loosely described as efforts to improve consumer ‘disclosure’ so that consumers, rather 
than legislators or regulators, can decide whether and how to use their credit cards.”). 
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coordinated design that characterizes the UCC, certainly must be a major 
factor in any evaluation of the future of the law of payments, including 
the evaluation in this Article. 
B. Automated Clearing House PaymentsLaw as a 
Public-Private Partnership 
While payment card systems arose in a manner highly visible to the 
end-user of the system, automated clearing house payments generally 
arose behind the scenes on the operational side of the banking industry. 
A typical consumer on the street is likely aware of such services as direct 
deposit or on-line bill pay, but he is just as likely not familiar with the 
term “automated clearing house.” Nonetheless, expansion into public 
awareness will likely increase exponentially with the phasing in of “Same 
Day ACH,” which is tentatively scheduled to begin in September 2016.131 
A system once principally of concern to the back rooms of banks will be 
front and center to a growing number of end-users. The development 
and governance of the ACH system must also be a part of any 
conversation on the future of payment systems. For present purposes, its 
structure as a public-private partnership is of particular importance, as is 
the scope of its rules outside of the public law sector. 
The original innovation of an automated clearing house, which 
settles transactions among banks, suggests a manual predecessor as 
indeed there was. “A clearing house,” said a 1915 treatise, “may be 
described as a place where the representatives of various member banks 
meet and, under the supervision of a competent committee or officer 
selected by them, make or receive payment of balances and so ‘clear’ the 
transactions of the day upon which the settlement is made.”132 Thus, the 
purpose of the manual clearing house was centralized coordination as to 
delivery and receipt of paper checks, along with settling the related bank-
customer accounts. 
In the United States, an association of over fifty New York banks 
organized the New York Clearing House in 1853.133 Before the 
establishment of a centralized clearing house, bank checks were settled 
on an individual bank-to-bank basis, a process that at the time involved 
porters carrying actual bags of money amongst the banks.134 This process 
 
 131. NACHA Membership Approves Same Day ACH, NACHA (May 19, 2015), https://www.nacha.org/ 
news/nacha-membership-approves-same-day-ach (stating that “Same Day ACH will be implemented in a 
phased approach” with the first phase supporting uses like “hourly payroll, person-to-person (P2P) payments 
and same-day bill pay.”). 
 132. John Edson Brady, The Law of Bank Checks 331 (1915). 
 133. About TCH: A Look Back, The Clearing House, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about-tch/ 
a-look-back. The New York Clearing House, while still based in New York, is now known as “The 
Clearing House.” Id. 
 134. Albert R. Barrett, Modern Banking Methods and Practical Bank Bookkeeping 246 (1903). 
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was becoming increasingly cumbersomenot to mention riskyfor the 
nation’s growing financial capital, hence the idea that the area banks 
would benefit from the efficiency of clearing their transactions 
centrally.135 Other regions eventually followed New York’s example for 
processing local paper checks.136 The establishment of the Federal 
Reserve in 1913 provided the basis for a national framework for clearing 
checks across regions.137 
An ACH is essentially the extension of the paper check processing 
function of the original manual clearing houses into the realm of 
nonpaper payments.138 The ACH concept first originated in California in 
1968, when the Los Angeles and San Francisco Clearing House 
Associations established the Special Committee on Paperless Entries 
(“SCOPE”), with a charge to study the possibility of reducing the need for 
banks to handle paper checks.139 By 1972, SCOPE had developed a 
computer software package and operational rules that became the basis for 
the California Automated Clearing House Association, a membership 
association made up of California banks.140 Similar regional associations 
organized shortly thereafter in Georgia, the Upper Midwest, and New 
England, all enabling their members to handle batched electronic 
payments within their respective regions.141 
 In 1974, these four regional ACH Associations formed NACHA 
initially as a unit within the American Bankers Association.142 Both 
NACHA and the Federal Reserve Bank licensed the existing SCOPE 
software as the basis for a unified payments platform.143 Other regions 
soon joined in, such that by 1978, financial institutions located anywhere 
in the United States had the ability to exchange ACH payments within 
the framework of a common set of rules promulgated by NACHA.144 
 
 135. Id. (“The annoyance of this was so great that it necessitated the organization of a clearing-
house.”). 
 136. Id. at 246–48 (describing early twentieth century clearing house processes in Boston, 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Minneapolis). 
 137. The Federal Reserve Act provides that “[e]very Federal reserve bank shall receive on deposit 
at par from depository institutions or from Federal reserve banks checks and . . . drafts drawn upon 
any of its depositors . . .” Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94 § 16, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 221 (West 2015)); see generally Farmers’ & Merchs’ Bank of Monroe, N. C. v. 
Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, VA., 262 U.S. 649 (1923) (describing the check-clearing function of 
the regional Federal Reserve Banks); Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 792 (1978). 
 138. Fredric H. Karr, Automated Clearing Houses: The Case for Barring Thrift Institutions, 95 
Banking L.J. 823, 827 (1978) (“[A]n ACH is functionally similar to a traditional paper-based clearing 
house . . . .”). 
 139. Nat’l Comm’n on Elec. Fund Transfers, EFT and the Public Interest, 65–66 (1977). 
 140. Id. at 66. 
 141. NACHA at 40, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/s/timeline/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 142. History and Network Statistics, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/ach-network/timeline (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016). 
 143. NACHA at 40, supra note 141. 
 144. History and Network Statistics, supra note 142. 
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The NACHA payments network has grown substantially over the 
last several decades, with the volume of ACH processed payments 
expanding from just over one billion in 1988,145 to nearly twenty-three 
billion payments in 2014, with 2014 itself reflecting an increase of one 
billion payment transactions over 2013.146 This growth not only includes 
payments that originate electronicallylike direct deposit payroll and 
on-line bill paybut it also includes the conversion of check payments 
into ACH payments, which then never enter the check-collection system. 
In 2006, for example, about eight percent of all checks written were 
converted to ACH payments, dramatic growth when compared with less 
than one percent of such checks three years earlier in 2003.147 In 2013, 
these Point-of-Purchase (“POP”) entries converted from checks 
accounted for over 406 million ACH transactions, albeit dropping to 
under 359 million in 2014.148 Interestingly, that forty-seven million 
decrease in volume of POP transactions, originating from paper, 
coincided with an increase of more than one billion ACH transactions 
during the same period,149 suggesting no resurgence in check-writing, but 
instead an increase in payment formats that do not involve checks at 
all.150 
NACHA’s rulemaking and governance process is formally private, 
with ultimate approval of new and revised rules in the hands of its 
members.151 The ACH system may, however, be more accurately 
characterized as a public-private partnership. The input, influence, and 
acquiescence of affected government agencies is clearly necessary to the 
success of the private system. Federal government participation is 
necessary and significant for at least two reasons. First, one of the largest 
and most longstanding uses of the ACH payment structure is for federal 
payments, such as employee payroll direct deposit, entitlement and 
benefits program payments, and federal income tax refunds.152 A system 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Amelia H. Boss, Convergence in Electronic Banking: Technological Convergence, Systems 
Convergence, Legal Convergence, 2 Drexel L. Rev. 63, 67–68 (2009). 
 148. History and Network Statics, supra note 142.  
 149. Id. 
 150. The smaller ACH transaction category for re-presented check entries (“RCK”) is used for 
checks that were first processed through the check collection system but were returned due to 
insufficient funds. RCK, like POP, similarly reflected a category decline in the face of overall ACH 
expansion, also suggesting lessened initial use of checks for payment. Id. (stating a 15.8% decline in 
RCK-coded ACH transactions from 4,573,791 in 2013 to 3,850,934 in 2014). The same point holds true 
for back-office conversion (BOC), an ACH type where the check is converted after the point of sale, 
as it declined from 178,262,806 transactions in 2013 to 163,654,206 in 2014, also during otherwise 
substantial growth in use of the ACH network. Id.  
 151. About NACHA, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/about (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“NACHA 
administers and facilitates private-sector operating rules for ACH payments, which define the roles 
and responsibilities of financial institutions and other ACH Network participants.” (emphasis added)). 
 152. Nat’l Comm’n on Elec. Fund Transfers, supra note 139, at 65–66. 
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that did not meet the needs of and incorporate the input of agencies like 
the U.S. Treasury Department and the Social Security Administration 
would soon find itself displaced, either by a private competitor 
orperhaps more likelya fully public law governance and regulatory 
structure. The second reason that federal government participation rises 
to the level of a partnership (albeit with public agencies filling a 
nominally junior role) is that the Federal Reserve System and its 
constituent regional banks are a critical and indispensable component of 
the current U.S. banking system. The Federal Reserve provides the 
infrastructure and trusted intermediary by which payment processing 
could grow from being merely locally effective and consistent to being a 
truly national system of commerce. 
A recent major rulemaking helps illustrate the players and process 
in NACHA’s governance, including its structural role in a public-private 
partnership with the Federal Reserve. On May 19, 2015, NACHA 
announced the adoption of its same day ACH rules, an action NACHA 
intends to create “a building block for a variety of products and services” 
by providing for rapid and comparatively inexpensive movement of 
money,153 bringing many electronic payment transactions closer to the 
instantaneous nature of cash. The rule anticipates three phases of 
implementation, each adding additional use cases for which the service 
will be available.154 Same day ACH certainly has the potential to be a 
payment systems game changer and a major means for expanding the 
role of the ACH system as a whole. 
NACHA’s process of getting to a final private rule is one that would 
be familiar to any student of administrative laws notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,155 with NACHA playing the role of the administrative 
agency. An idea for a rule proposal must come in the first instance from 
an “eligible party,” which includes NACHA officers and staff, direct 
member organizations (such as regional ACH associations), ACH 
operators, and government agencies.156 Stated examples of the important 
governmental category include the Treasury Department, the Federal 
 
 153.  NACHA Membership Approves Same Day ACH, NACHA (last visited Aug. 5, 2016), https:// 
www.nacha.org/news/nacha-membership-approves-same-day-ach (quoting Janet O. Estep, President and 
CEO of NACHA). 
 154. Id. (“In Phase 1, ACH credit transactions will be eligible for same day processing, supporting 
use cases such as hourly payroll, person-to-person (P2P) payments and same-day bill pay. In Phase 2, 
same-day ACH debits will be added, allowing for a wide variety of consumer bill payment use cases 
like utility, mortgage, loan and credit card payments. Phase 3 introduces faster ACH credit funds 
availability requirements for RDFIs; funds from Same Day ACH credit transactions will need to be 
available to customers by 5 p.m. RDFI local time. Phase 1 is scheduled to begin September 23, 2016.”). 
 155. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (West 2012) (stating legal requirements of federal agency 
rulemaking processes). 
 156. How the Rules Are Made, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/how-rules-are-made (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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Reserve Board, and the Social Security Administration.157 An eligible 
proposal then goes to NACHA’s Rules and Operations Committee, 
“which consists of industry representatives from ACH Network users.”158 
The Rules and Operations Committee can either reject the proposal or 
let it continue in the process, which includes assigning the proposed rule 
to a Standing Rules Group appointed from ACH network users, such as 
businesses and financial institutions.159 For a major rulemaking such as 
Same Day ACH, the Committee will develop a Request for Comment 
(“RFC”) or Request for Information (“RFI”) with assistance from the 
Group. These requests are then submitted to the NACHA membership, 
ultimately resulting in staff-drafted language of a proposed rule.160 
The Same Day ACH process resulted in an RFC in December 2014. 
Within a two-month comment period, NACHA received 214 responses 
to the request, either in the form of member surveys or comment 
letters.161 Individual financial institutions provided the bulk of the survey 
responses (141), while more prosaic comment letters most often came 
from multi-member associations (24).162 Based on the RFC responses, 
NACHA modified the proposal to account for operational concerns.163 
To become effective, a proposed NACHA rule must gain the approval of 
one of two alternative types of supermajority: (1) three-quarters of the 
total membership; or (2) two-thirds of the “weighted” vote based on the 
ACH volume of a member organization and the number of financial 
institutions represented by the organization. Additionally, if two-thirds 
of any one particular member category (such as Regional Payments 
Associations or Direct Financial Institutions) oppose a proposed rule, it 
cannot pass.164 In sum, a proposed rule impacting the technical operations 
of the institutions affected by the proposal cannot come into force unless 
it has extraordinarily broad support. Such a governance timetable  and 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Same Day ACH RFC Summary, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/same-day-ach-rfc-
summary (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 162. See id. (describing the RFC respondent demographics). 
 163. NACHA Membership Approves Same Day ACH, NACHA (May 19, 2015), https://www.nacha.org/ 
news/nacha-membership-approves-same-day-ach (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“The final rule closely mirrors 
the proposal outlined in the industry Request for Comment (RFC). With broad ACH Network user 
support for that proposal, modifications to the final rule were predominantly technical and operational 
in nature. Specifically, there were three key changes, reflecting feedback from the RFC process. First, 
the morning same-day window was modified to allow for more time to process transactions, with 
settlement occurring at 1:00 p.m. ET. This new settlement time would become effective in Phase 1 
instead of Phase 3, as originally proposed. Secondly, the rule creates an option for an additional 
method for ODFIs to use, at their discretion, with their Originators to determine intent for same-day 
settlement. Finally, there was an adjustment to the methodology for calculating the Same Day Entry 
fee to exclude opportunity costs from its calculation.”). 
 164. How the Rules Are Made, supra note 156. 
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restrictions would be unthinkable for a state legislature or the U.S. 
Congress whicheven at their most dysfunctionalare obligated to 
accomplish some minimal amounts of discrete activity, such as authorizing 
budget appropriations. For a private membership organization with 
particular shared functional goals, however, the process is appropriate and 
effective. In this case, NACHA announced approval of the Same Day 
ACH rule on May 19, 2015.165 The major change had clear and 
overwhelming support. 
With the ACH payment system, private governance creates private 
law on matters of operational concern to the functioning of the system. 
The Federal Reserve and other government agencies are such a 
necessary and looming presence that one may best describe the ACH 
system as a public-private partnership, perhaps analogous to the private 
governance of stock exchanges in the midst of public regulation by the 
federal Securities and Exchange Commission. The governance and 
phenomenal growth of the ACH system is a data point that anyone 
seeking a future for public payments law must consider, right alongside 
the rise of the card systems. The rise of the ACH system proves that 
private operations governance, even when conducted as a public-private 
partnership, is able to respond to technological change in a way that a 
public law code like the UCC cannot. Nonetheless, the ACH system 
shares with the card system a contrasting lesson about the need for public 
law, as all consumer ACH transactions are subject to the Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act just like their debit card cousins. The lesson here, 
again, is that once basic and bright-line end-user protections are in place, 
payment system operators will have sufficient incentive to improve and 
upgrade the technology and security of their operations, absent a 
comprehensive public regulatory scheme. A modest amount of user 
protection goes a long way. ACH stands as another compelling example 
that the UCC paradigm of a comprehensive regulatory structure has 
faded, and the fading has come with little or no ill effect. 
C. UCC Comeback? Updating (and Not Updating) the 
Payment Articles 
The rise and ongoing expansion of card-based and automated 
clearing house payment systems would, on first thought, seem to be a 
situation ripe for lawmaking by the same uniform laws process that 
brought about the Uniform Commercial Code. And indeed, that thought 
has been acted upon many times since the original promulgation of UCC 
Articles 3 and 4. The high-water mark for ambitious reform of state 
payments law was the proposed Uniform New Payments Code (“NPC”) 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The ultimate demise of the NPC project 
 
 165. Same Day ACH RFC Summary, supra note 161.  
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in 1985 was the beginning of a new era for the public law of payment 
systems: an era of occasional advancessuch as the enactment of Article 
4Awas overshadowed by marginalization enabled by the combination 
of technology and private contract law. Articles 3 and 4 never actually 
lost their places; instead, the real-world activity of payments moved 
elsewhere, resulting in the legal cacophony that exists today. This Part 
reviews briefly how these events came to pass becauselike the rise of 
the payment card and ACH systemsthey reveal lessons for the future 
of public payments law. 
The Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”) for the UCC created a 
committee in 1974 called the “3-4-8 Committee,” and charged it with 
studying and updating the three articles enumerated in its name in light 
of the impact of electronic systems.166 Following a comparatively swift and 
noncontroversial modernization of Article 8 on investment securities, 
attention then turned to the payment articles. 
“The New Payments Code project,” recounted Commission 
Executive Director Fred Miller shortly after the project’s demise, “began 
with the belief that certain technological advances necessitated various 
amendments to Uniform Commercial Code articles 3 and 4, which govern 
commercial paper and bank deposits and collections.”167 That belief in the 
inadequacy of Articles 3 and 4 was widely shared, even in the 1970s when 
the technological disconnect was far less pronounced than it is today. 
Credit cards and electronic funds transfers were not only becoming more 
prominent, but even payments involving checks were affected by 
technology and were not well reflected in a UCC principally drafted in 
the 1940s and 1950s.168 Though the New Payments Code (“NPC”) would 
have diminished the UCC proper by causing the repeal of Article 4 and 
the removal of checks and drafts from Article 3,169 it was nonetheless 
inspired by the scope and scale of the UCC. The NPC, as project 
Reporter Hal S. Scott stated, was “intended to provide a comprehensive 
legal framework for all types of noncash payments.”170 Karl Llewellyn 
and the original UCC drafters would have felt right at home with this 
“ambitious” effort to craft an all-encompassing code.171 The NPC even 
 
 166. Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A. A Study in Process and Scope, 42 Ala. L. Rev. 405, 
407 (1991). Article 8 on securities law was updated comparatively quickly to account for the uncertificated 
securities and other then-recent developments, and it was finally approved by both NCCUSL and the 
ALI in 1977. Id. 
 167. Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. Law. 1007, 1007–08 (1986) (describing 
the background of the New Payments Code project). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Uniform New Payments Code P.E.B. Draft 3, § 2 (“Applicability of Code”), cmt. 2. 
P.E.B. Draft 3 is generally considered to be the most widely-disseminated version of the NPC. 
 170. Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1664, 1665–66 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 171. Roland E. Brandel & Anne Geary, Electronic Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code, 
37 Bus. Law. 1065, 1074 (1982); see Peter A. Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification 
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contemplated displacement of the federal EFTA.172 “The basic rationale 
of the NPC is that the legal rights defined for parties to payment 
transactions ought to be as similar for each payment system as is 
possible[,]” and that “any dissimilar principles should be based on a clear 
technological or other necessity, and not on historic accident or the 
ability of special interests to wrest concessions.”173 All types of payments 
were accordingly reduced to only two categories, draw orders and pay 
orders, with payments in each category treated the same as all other 
payments within the category.174 This goal of consistency across payment 
systems was a worthy one, and the need to address electronic payments 
was undeniable. What went wrong? 
The consistency goal turned out to be problematic and at times 
“tended to represent a somewhat extreme position,” at least insofar as 
payment system stakeholders were concerned.175 Objections to early 
drafts, for example, arose from eradication of the holder-in-due-course 
concept, and the importation from TILA’s credit card provisions176 of a 
right of reversibility for all consumer payment orders.177 By the time of 
Permanent Editorial Board Draft No. 3 in 1983, consistency was losing 
out to process expediency, with the holder-in-due-course doctrine 
revived, except as against original consumer drawers.178 The right of 
reversibility was removed from payments by check, and, perhaps more 
critically, became subject to contractual waiver.179 
Opposition was churning among interested parties to the plan for a 
comprehensive payments code even before completion of the NPC’s first 
draft, and some issues raised at the outset continued to plague the NPC 
throughout the entire drafting process. What aspects of payment systems 
governance, for example, should be left to private contract? A 1978 
meeting on the topic in Williamsburg, Virginia had sought input from 
“practicing attorneys, law professors, consumer representatives, 
representatives of industry, and state and federal regulators of payments 
 
of Payments Law, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 83, 90 (1984) (likewise describing the NPC drafting effort as 
“ambitious”). 
 172. Scott, supra note 170, at 1665–66. 
 173. Brandel & Geary, supra note 171, at 1074. 
 174. See Fairfax Leary, Jr. & J. Stephen Pitcairn, The Uniform New Payments Code: The Essential 
Identity of “Pay” Orders and “Draw” Orders, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 913–14 (1984) (“The draftsmen 
of the proposed UNPC have apparently perceived an important difference between the ‘draw’ order 
(basically, a draft, check or other message given a creditor to present to a payor account institution) 
and the ‘pay’ order (a payment order presented directly to an account institution by its own 
customer).”). 
 175. Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. Law. 1215, 1217 (1984). 
 176. See infra Part II.C, text accompanying notes 86–99. 
 177. Miller, supra note 175, at 1217. 
 178. Id. at 1218. 
 179. Id.  
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systems.”180 Arguments against the NPC included the assertion that “areas 
where there was no law could be covered adequately by agreement” and 
that “the flexibility afforded by the lack of regulation was, if not necessary, 
at least highly desirable given ongoing system development.”181 The 
subsequent success of the payment card and ACH systems suggests not 
only that these arguments against the NPC had merit in 1978, but that 
these considerations should inform payments policy today, as well. 
Another NPC drafting difficulty with resonance in the present day 
lay in determining the appropriate role for consumer protection 
provisions. The effort to standardize payments law across checks, credit 
cards, and electronic fund transfers hadat least initiallyresulted in 
the imposition of “consumer protection features” of the federal TILA 
and EFTA onto the checking system, much to the displeasure of banks.182 
Five years after the original conference, a second conference was held in 
Williamsburg in 1983, and it led to a decision by the 3-4-8 Committee to 
reorganize the NPC (existing at that time in PEB Draft No. 3) “along 
functional lines without the special consumer provisions.”183  
The decision to delete the consumer-specific protections “was made 
primarily because no consensus on the consumer provisions seemed 
likely.”184 The Permanent Editorial Board decided that these matters were 
“better left to the federal government and the states” outside of the 
uniform laws drafting process.185 The revision plan also called for a 
substantial reorganization that subdivided draw orders and pay orders 
into further categories of written, electronic, and prearranged orders.186 
The removal of consumer protection provisions, however, cost the NPC 
the support of consumer interests, while the banking interests who 
opposed it initially never came around to support the NPC in a merely 
functional version.187 By 1985, the NPC project was no more, and the 
UCC’s PEB instead turned its attention to less ambitious goals.188 While 
the NPC itself perished, the entire decade-spanning episode still survives 
 
 180. Id. at 1217. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Rubin, supra note 55, at 557–58 (asserting reasons for the demise of the NPC project). 
 183. Miller, supra note 175, at 1220. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Miller, supra note 167, at 1008. 
 186. Id. at 1221–22. 
 187. Rubin, supra note 55, at 557–58; see Alces, supra note 171, at 101–02 (detailing points of 
opposition to the NPC raised by the New York Clearing House). 
 188. Miller, supra note 167, at 1008; see Miller, supra note 166, at 409 (“The attempted ‘fix’ [of the 
NPC] was not successful. Even with it, there was little support for the NPC and active opposition 
continued. As a result, in mid-1985 the NCCUSL and the ALI terminated the NPC project, and 
instead created two new projects to proceed in tandem . . . .”). 
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as a data point for those suggesting and criticizing special-interest 
“capture” of the uniform law drafting process.189 
Two projects born in the demise of the NPC were much more 
successful in achieving promulgation and legislative adoption, but they 
ultimately did not stem the fragmentation of public payments law. First, 
the drafters created a new Article 4A to govern commercial funds 
transfers, particularly wholesale wire transfers, an area that had been 
largely void of governing law.190 Commercial funds transfers were notably 
also in no need of consumer protection, since consumer transactions 
subject to the EFTA were excluded from the article.191 Article 4A was 
promulgated in 1989.192 Second, the drafters sought to modernize Articles 
3 and 4, so that those parts of the UCC could at least deal with the late 
1980’s technology in the check processing system, including the 
possibility of “truncating” checksthat is, converting checks to digital 
form and facilitating the (once unfathomable) act of destroying the 
original paper documents.193 Revised Articles 3 and 4 were promulgated 
in 1990.194 
The “strongest legacy” of the defunct NPC was the “exclusion, 
consistent with the traditional UCC approach, of affirmative consumer 
protection” from the three payment articles.195 Justification for this 
approach included the fact that consumer law (both state and federal) 
had developed non-uniformly and outside of the UCC, making an 
attempt at uniform consumer protection provisions undesirable to 
jurisdictions that had both more-protective and less-protective existing 
policies.196 Furthermore, consumer protection law cannot be made 
 
 189. Janger, supra note 64, at 586–87 (asserting that the New Payments Code illustrates how 
“actual capture of the ALI/NCCUSL process is a real concern when a uniform enactment has the 
potential to benefit an organized group at the expense of a diffuse and disorganized group.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 170, at 1675 (“Unlike contracts in the check system, for example, 
which are broadly legitimized by the U.C.C., these private contracts do not operate within any 
statutory framework and may be unenforceable on grounds such as adhesion or unconscionability.”). 
 191. See U.C.C. § 4-108 (West 2014) (stating exclusions from the scope of Article 4A). 
 192. UCC Article 4A, Funds Transfers (1989) Summary, Nat’l Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%204A%2C% 
20Funds%20Transfers%20(1989) (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 193. See generally Id. § 4-406, cmt. 3 (referencing truncation as an alternative to check return or 
retention). 
 194. Bruce A. Campbell, The Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 70 Mich. B.J. 296, 296 (1991) (“In mid-1990, both the ALI and the [Uniform Law Commission] 
approved a revised Article 3, with conforming miscellaneous amendments to Articles 1 and 4, for 
submission to the states.”). 
 195. Miller, supra note 166, at 412–13. 
 196. Id. at 414 (asserting that a uniform payments act addressing consumer protection “would 
likely be unacceptable in lieu of established provisions in the states where extensive provisions already 
had been negotiated”). 
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variable by agreement, and accordingly was inconsistent with the 
flexibility needed in an infrequently amended code.197 
Articles 3 and 4 were subject to another set of revisions in 2002, but 
these revisions were even more modest than the 1990 rewrite. After 
some consideration of harmonizing Articles 3 and 4 with the Federal 
Reserve’s Regulation CC, which implements the Expedited Funds 
Availability Act, the 2002 amendments ultimately consisted of primarily 
technical updates.198 The most robust changes in the amendments 
package affectednot payments as suchbut the law of guarantors, 
harmonizing the UCC with the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and 
Guaranty.199 The project did not go farther, as there was “little interest on 
the part of the Federal Reserve Board and the banking industry to 
redraft Articles 3 and 4 to comport with Regulation CC.”200 Public 
payments law would remain fragmented and increasingly marginalized. 
In many observers’ opinions, Articles 3 and 4 now “do little work” in the 
payments arena.201 
Despite some important updating of Articles 3 and 4 and with the 
addition of Article 4A to cover a category of small-volume but high-
dollar amount business wire transfers, the UCC today covers largely the 
same consumer-payments territory that it did in the 1960schecks as 
negotiable instruments.202 This limited coverage in the face of checks 
being overtaken by other payment options is certainly not for lack of 
effort and vision on the drafters’ side, as reflected in the NPC. The 
dominant lesson of the marginalization of the UCC payment articles is 
that their scope is difficult to expand, even when circumstances call for 
expansion. Payments is an area of rapidly evolving technology, and the 
necessarily time-consuming task of drafting, promulgating, and achieving 
acceptance of a uniform act is difficult in such a fieldand the difficulty 
increases a whole order of magnitude when payments law is wedded to 
consumer protection. Despite the sea change in technology, updates to 
the UCC payment articles have tended toward minimalism. In the 
meantime, the success of debit and credit cards has proven that payment 
systems can function quite well without a comprehensive code. 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 La. L. 
Rev. 1097, 1141–42 (2002) (recounting that in the process leading up to the 2002 revisions, neither the 
banking industry nor the Federal Reserve Board expressed interest in redrafting Articles 3 and 4 to 
comport with Regulation CC). 
 199. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 1 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2014). 
 200. Rasmussen, supra note 198, at 1142. 
 201. See, e.g., id. 
 202. Cf. Daryl B. Robertson, Report of the Commercial Code Committee of the Section of Business 
Law of the State Bar of Texas on Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 425, 429 (1995) 
(“Revised UCC Article 3 could be regarded as further codification of the common law of negotiable 
instruments that began in the United States with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law 
promulgated by the Commissioners in 1896.”).  
Burge-67.6.docx (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:35 PM 
August 2016] APPLE PAY, BITCOIN, AND CONSUMERS 1523 
III.  Emerging Payments Technology and Its Legal 
Frameworkor Lack Thereof 
Law lagging behind societal and technological developments is 
unsurprising,203 but in the case of payments law, the lag has not prevented 
innovation, despite the existence of considerable challenges.204 Indeed, 
the framework of constant innovation is ultimately the norm to which the 
law must comply, even more so than the practices of consumers and 
businesses. This Part will describe exemplars of two major streams of 
innovation, and position them in the current scheme of payments law. 
First, the development of mobile payment innovation, exemplified here by 
Apple Pay, creating new means of payment through existing financial 
channels, frequently stretching their application far beyond their originally 
attended arenas. Second, the development of decentralized virtual 
currency or “cryptocurrency,” exemplified here by Bitcoin, represents a 
complete bypassing of existing financial channels, completely defying most 
existing legal frameworks. Both of these instances of emerging payment 
practice and technology represent the next types of challenge to the 
public law paradigm for payment systems. These challenges must be 
accounted for when conceptualizing the future of payments law. 
A. Apple Pay and Other Mobile Payments 
What exactly are mobile payments? In a March 2015 report, the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Consumer and Community Affairs 
broadly defined mobile payments as “purchases, bill payments, charitable 
donations, payments to another person, or any other payments made using 
a mobile phone.”205 The means of access could be by a web page through 
the web browser on a mobile device, by sending a text message (“SMS”), 
or by using a downloadable app on a mobile device.206 The rapid 
development of mobile payments is, unsurprisingly, following in the 
wake of developments in smartphone technology. 
Major players in the smartphone marketparticularly Apple, 
Samsung, and Googleare all seeking to establish dominant positions in 
the mobile payments space with their respective payment platforms: 
Apple Pay, Samsung Pay, and Android Pay. These platforms do notat 
least not yethave market potential as large as their brand acceptance 
 
 203. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 73 (1967) (“In popular parlance, this or that aspect of the law is often 
said to ‘lag behind the times.’”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep 
Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 239, 239 (2007) (“It is often stated that 
the law lags behind technology.”). 
 204. See Winn, supra note 120, at 695 (“Novel services are finding it difficult to fulfill the conditions 
required to make a modern payment system function in any environment.”). 
 205. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumers and Mobile Financial Services 
2015 14 (2015).  
 206. Id. 
Burge-67.6.docx (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016 4:35 PM 
1524 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1493 
because the platforms work on only more recent devices. For example, 
Samsung Pay, which launched at the end of September 2015, is only 
compatible with the 2014 Galaxy S6 phone series and subsequent high-
end Samsung devices.207 Google released Android Pay in mid-September 
2015, but it will work only on phones running Android version 4.4 (“Kit 
Kat”) or higher.208 Apple Pay similarly requires a 2014 iPhone 6 series or 
later.209 Notably, all of the qualifying devices have built-in near-field 
communication (“NFC”) capability, which enables a contactless swipe of 
the phone for point-of-sale payments.210 Lag in new technology adoption 
is thus a challenge for all three of these payment platforms, but the 
challenge is one that should diminish over time. Because Apple Pay is 
the most established of these three mobile payment platforms, this article 
will use Apple Pay as the exemplar of methods and issues typical of 
mobile payments in general. 
Mobile payment systems tend, unlike the cryptocurrency discussed 
below, to be built upon the existing legal framework for electronic 
paymentspayment cards and ACH debits. Indeed, the term “digital 
wallet” is particularly appropriate for systems like Apple Pay because it 
uses the same payment devices that would be located in a physical 
walletcredit cards and debit cards.211 Accordingly, the initial hurdle to 
user adoption of mobile payments is getting the user to input their 
payment card data, an idea that seems risky at first blush. Payment cards 
have, from their inception, had to deal with the problem of unauthorized 
payments, such as those made using a lost or stolen card.  
Unauthorized use can be a particular problem with debit and credit 
cards that do not require use of personal identification number (“PIN”) 
codes for their use (typical of the MasterCard and Visa networks). Apple 
Pay has two principal ways of preventing unauthorized payments. One is 
simply to introduce the PIN to what would be PIN-less transactions with 
 
 207. Samsung states that its payment product works with Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge+, Samsung 
Galaxy Note5, Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge, and the Samsung Galaxy S6, all released in 2014 and later. See 
Samsung Pay: Compatibility, Samsung, http://www.samsung.com/us/support/owners/app/samsung-pay 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 208. See Get Started with Android Pay, Google, https://support.google.com/androidpay/answer/ 
6224811?hl=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). The “Kit Kat” version of the Android operating system was 
released in October 2013. Id. 
 209. See Secure, Simple, and Even More Useful, Apple, http://www.apple.com/apple-pay/ (listing 
devices that are Apple Pay enabled). 
 210. Jessica M. Gray, Note, How Apple Pay Coincides with the Consumer Financial Protection Act: 
Will Apple Become a Regulated Entity?, 16 J. High Tech. L. 170, 181 (2015) (“Apple Pay’s technology 
uses a near field communication (‘NFC’) to allow customers to pay at a checkout counter with 
fingerprint authentication.”). 
 211. See Secure, Simple, and Even More Useful, supra note 209 (describing the usage of Apple’s 
Wallet app). 
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the actual card.212 While that method adds beneficial security in the event 
of the loss or theft of an iPhone, it also adds friction to the payments 
process beyond what would occur with a physical payment card. Friction 
in the payment process is a substantial concern for card-accepting 
merchants. Even the long-planned shift from magnetic stripe to EMV213 
embedded-chip cards has been slower to implement than expected, based 
in part on merchant fears of losing point-of-sale business.214 The more 
innovative solution in new mobile devices is a fingerprint or other 
biometric sensor, which is not only a more secure method for 
determining individual authorization, but is also less intrusive in the 
payments process than even the use of a plastic payment card. 
The key technology in overcoming both actual and perceived risks 
of unauthorized mobile paymentsand what stands to make mobile 
payments more secure than plastic cardsis the process of tokenization. 
When a user makes a payment with Apple Pay, the system does not 
transmit the user’s actual credit or debit card numbers. Instead, a unique 
“device account number” is assigned, encrypted and securely stored (in the 
case of Apple Pay) in a “Secure Element” chip built into the hardware.215 
Every payment then generates a transaction-specific data tokena 
“dynamic security code.”216 This token represents one-time authority to 
make one specific payment for a specific amount to a specific 
merchant.217 Because a particular token will not be used more than once, 
the risk exposure from the token being intercepted is minimal. No card 
counterfeiting akin to fraudulent “skimming” of the magnetic strip on 
 
 212. Id. (allowing for either use of a passcode number or a physical fingerprint for each transaction 
using the Wallet app). 
 213. EMV stands for “Europay, MasterCard, and Visa,” after the originator of the technical 
specifications for the chip system. Tracy Kitten, The History of EMW: An EMW Forefather Explains Why 
Chip Is the Future, Bank Info Security (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/ 
history-emv-i-933 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). Despite the origin of this acronym, EMV chips are now used 
across most cards, including American Express and Discover, for example. EMVCO Members, EMVCO, 
http://www.emvco.com/about_emvco.aspx?id=156 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 214. See The Consumer ABCs of EMV, PYMNTS.com (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.pymnts.com/in- 
depth/2015/the-consumer-abcs-of-emv/ (advising retailers to understand “common problems that could arise 
during the transaction, including potential lag times in card authentication.”). 
 215. David Narkiewicz, Apple Pay: Beginning of the End of Plastic Credit Cards?, 36 Pa. Law. 60 
(2014). Other mobile payment systems do not necessarily store the underlying payments data in 
hardware, instead keeping this data in software installed on the mobile device. Id. 
 216. Press Release, MasterCard, Apple Pay Available to MasterCard Customers in the UK from 
Today (July 14, 2015) (on file with author), http://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/apple-pay-
available-to-mastercard-customers-in-the-uk-from-today/. 
 217. See Lydia Segal et al., Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective on Tackling an Intransigent 
Problem, 16 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 743, 766 (2011) (“With tokenization, the substitution of the 
credit card number with a string of other numbers called a token, merchants store the token, not the 
credit card number or other data on the card’s magnetic stripe. Rather, the payment processor or bank 
keeps the credit card number and associated data in a secure server or “vault,” and is able to map 
tokens to their corresponding credit card numbers.”).  
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the back of a payment card should be possible.218 Mobile payment 
security exceeds that of a plastic card because the end-user does not have 
to show an actual credit or debit card, or reveal her name, card number, 
or security code to the cashier when paying in-store.219 
A mobile payment transaction reflects innovation that partially 
involves existing tried-and-true payment systemsdebit and credit cards. 
To the extent mobile payments ride the rails of existing systems, the case 
for applying existing lawsuch as TILA and EFTAis strongest. The 
new electronic overlay, however, creates some degree of legal 
uncertainty. In the case of our Apple Pay example, Apple has complete 
control over the entire authorization and tokenization processes. If the 
fingerprint reader or the Secure Element chip in an iPhone fails, the 
failure comes from Apple hardware, not from the credit card issuing 
bank or card network ultimately authorized by the device. If a user’s 
Wallet App is hacked so as to allow fraudulent or unauthorized access, 
the exploited weakness was in Apple software rather than in any 
operations of a merchant’s acquirer bank or in the card network itself. 
Past determinations of which party was in the best position to prevent 
unauthorized use tended to center around only two parties on the 
purchaser’s sidethe card issuer and the card user.220 The mobile system 
operator is now unquestionably a third factor in the process, and the 
public law of payments generally does not account for this third role. 
Google and Samsung are in the same position as Apple in grafting a new 
payment platform onto existing systems.221 
Mobile payments represent a significant challenge in reaching 
outside the existing contours of the allocations of liability in payments 
law for fraud and unauthorized use. That challenge is important for 
future public payments law, but the scope of the challenge pales in 
comparison to that raised by cryptocurrency. 
  
 
 218. See Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud Liability Rules, 5 Brook. J. 
Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 1, 9 (2010) (asserting long before the launch of Apple Pay that greater use of 
“tokenization and end-to-end encryption” would discourage skimming and other forms of credit card 
fraud).  
 219. Narkiewicz, supra note 215, at 60. 
 220. See Francis J. Facciolo, Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the Losses, 
83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 607 (2008) (describing traditional payment system risk analysis as 
considering who, among “either customers or financial institutions” could take precautions against loss 
so as to “place the obligation on the party who can avoid the loss at the lowest cost.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Press Release, MasterCard, MasterCard Powers Android Pay, Bringing Mobile 
Payments to Android Device Owners (May 28, 2015) (on file with author). 
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B. Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrency 
While Apple Pay and other mobile payment innovations generally 
function through existing financial channels, and thus substantially implicate 
current law in those systems, so-called “cryptocurrency” is built on a 
radically different approach. These virtual currenciesmost prominently 
Bitcoinuse technology to bypass existing financial channels, up to and 
including government central banks like the Federal Reserve.222 As a 
consequence of this rejection of existing financial structures, 
cryptocurrencies raise a more diverse set of issues for payments law. 
Because Bitcoin represents the most established form of cryptocurrency in 
circulation today, this Article will use it as the exemplar for this stream of 
payments technology. 
Navigating the arena of cryptocurrency requires navigating shifting 
terminology. The United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) defined “virtual currency” as “a medium of exchange that 
operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all the 
attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual currency does not have 
legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”223 In its broadest sense, the term 
“virtual currency” could encompass a variety of stores of value, ranging 
from physical to digital in form and from centralized to decentralized in 
control.224 All virtual currencies exist in contrast to government-issued 
fiat currency like the U.S. dollar or the European Union (“EU”) Euro. 
As its name implies, “fiat currency” initially derives its value by 
governmental fiat, a directive that the currency is legal tender225 within its 
issuing jurisdiction.226 Fiat currency does not have any intrinsic value227 
 
 222. See Daniela Sonderegger, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of 
Regulation, 47 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 175, 177 (2015) (observing that Bitcoin has been “[h]ailed the 
ultimate alternative to the global banking system” and that it “seeks to separate money from the 
state’s regulatory power.”). 
 223. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Dep’t of Treasury, Guidance: Application of FinCEN’s 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies 1 (Mar. 18, 2013); 
see Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies and Federal Law, 18 J. Consumer & Com. L. 65, 67 (2014) 
(describing the FinCEN guidance). 
 224. Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 Ind. 
L.J. 441, 442–44 (2014). 
 225. Or, to quote the ubiquitous statement on the upper-right face of the U.S. one dollar bill (and 
elsewhere): “THIS NOTE IS LEGAL TENDER FOR ALL DEBTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE.” 
 226. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (West 2016) (providing that U.S. coins and currency, “including 
Federal reserve notes” are legal tender “for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”).  
 227. At various points in its history, the American dollar was also a “commodity currency” when 
the dollar was pegged to a commitment by the United States to buy and sell gold at a fixed price of 
dollars per ounce. See Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law 2 (George Wash. Univ. Law 
Sch., Working Paper No. 9, 2015). The last abandonment of any vestiges of a gold standard occurred in 
1971, when “President Nixon announced that the United States would no longer honor its pledge to 
buy and sell gold, not just at thirty-five dollars per ounce but at any price.” Kenneth W. Dam, From 
the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 504, 528 (1983); see Peter C. Tucker, Note, The Digital Currency Doppelganger: 
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based on the paper on which it is printed or in its digital representation in 
a bank account. Rather, the value of fiat currency is ultimately based on 
trustfaith in the creditworthiness of the issuing entity.  
“Cryptocurrency” here specifically refers to a digital form of virtual 
currency that is typicallybut not necessarilydecentralized.228 Bitcoin is 
a paradigmatic cryptocurrency in that it is: (1) digital; (2) largely 
decentralized; and (3) not backed by the fiat of any government issuer. 
Despite the potential nuances in meaning, “virtual currency,” “digital 
currency,”229 and “cryptocurrency” are often used as fully synonymous 
terms,230 but this Article will use the term cryptocurrency to refer to digital 
virtual currencies that utilize cryptography, enabling its use without a 
centralized authority governing it. 
Bitcoin itself is the brainchild of a programmer (or possibly a group 
of programmers) who went under the moniker “Satoshi Nakamoto,” who 
developed the programming between 2007 and 2009.231 Nakamoto’s name 
is widely considered to be a pseudonym and determining the identity 
underlying the name has become something of a parlor game, with 
controversy surrounding the claims of Australian tech personality Craig 
Wright being one of the latest episodes.232 At least one translation of 
“Satoshi Nakamoto” from Japanese to English renders it meaning 
“thinking clearly outside the foundation.”233 Programming technology 
 
Regulatory Challenge or Harbinger of the New Economy?, 17 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 589, 623–24 
(2009) (“The advantages of gold-backed currency versus fiat currency have been the subject of debate 
for centuries.”). 
 228. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin 
Age, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 271, 278–79 (2015) (“Bitcoin is a type of virtual currency. More specifically, 
Bitcoin is a crypto-currency, a form of money that relies on encryption or cryptography (instead of a 
central authority such as a national bank or government) to control its creation.”) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
 229. See, e.g., Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 Hastings 
Sci. & Tech. L.J. 159, 160 (2012) (categorizing Bitcoin as “a digital, decentralized, partially anonymous 
currency”). 
 230. See, e.g., Judith Lee et al., Bitcoin Basics: A Primer on Virtual Currencies, 16 Bus. L. Int’l 21, 
21 (2015) (“In the past five years, virtual currencies, or ‘cryptocurrencies’ have evolved tremendously 
and are quickly establishing themselves as a payment system.”). 
 231. Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1485, 1488 (2014); see Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), 
www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 232. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Craig Wright Claims He’s Bitcoin Creator SatoshiExperts Fear 
an Epic Scam, Forbes (May 2, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/#10625d5a708f (“We may 
never know the true identity of the real Satoshi Nakamoto. Australian academic Craig Wright has 
reportedly confirmed himself as the Bitcoin creator, signing messages with cryptographic keys said to 
solely belong to Satoshi in private sessions with a handful of media organizations and community 
luminaries. But within minutes of Wright’s claims being published, encryption experts have expressed 
doubt.”).  
 233. See Alec Liu, Who Is Satoshi Nakamoto, the Creator of Bitcoin?, Motherboard (May 22, 2013, 
10:45 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto-the-creator-of-bitcoin; Eric P. 
Pacy, Note, Tales from the Cryptocurrency: On Bitcoin, Square Pegs, and Round Holes, 49 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 121, 124 n.14 (2014). 
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enabling verifiable digital signatures existed well before Bitcoin, and 
these already allowed for electronic exchanges of currency, both fiat and 
virtual. These exchanges, however, required the participation of a trusted 
third-partysuch as a bank or a payment card networkto manage the 
transactions. Only a trusted third-party could prevent the “double-
spending problem,” which is the ability of a digitally-signing party to 
spend the same money more than once.234 Any currency susceptible to 
such electronic counterfeiting would inevitably lose its value, just as 
widely counterfeited paper currency would lose its value. A merchant is 
unlikely to accept someone else’s dollars as value in exchange for goods 
if she can readily print her own dollars and keep the goods at the same 
time. Electronic payments are not viable if they do not transmit a data 
token that either represents scarce currency (as do traditional electronic 
payments) or else is itself the scarce currency (as Bitcoins are). Trust in 
the third-party controller of an electronic payment system plays an 
integral and irreplaceable part in any viable electronic transmission 
system for fiat currency. 
Bitcoin, in contrast, was revolutionary because its programming 
accomplished something never done before: It eliminated the need for a 
trusted third-party in a digital currency transaction, and did so in a 
manner that, for the moment, has ensured the measured growth and 
scarcity of the digital commodity.235 Bitcoin eliminated the trusted third-
party in favor of a decentralized, peer-to-peer network, and its 
infrastructure allows it to be effectively resistant to both first-party fraud 
and third-party hackers.236 
The core innovation of Bitcoin enabling decentralized verification 
functionality is the “blockchain,” which creates a transaction leger that, 
within an acceptably small margin of error, enables the peer-to-peer 
network to verify that a transaction transferring Bitcoins is 
legitimatethat is, not a duplicate.237 Each Bitcoin transaction requires 
authorization by the owner’s private encrypted key, which then creates 
an entry on the public encrypted key for the Bitcoin address and creates 
a new and unique programming block on the blockchain whose 
authenticity is verifiable in the public Bitcoin leger. Crafting a blockchain 
of fake transfers that could withstand verification against the public leger 
would be, for all practical purposes, impossible.238 If blocks are not 
properly linked together in the blockchain, then the distributed software 
 
 234. Nakamoto, supra note 231, at 1; see Bayern, supra note 231, at 1489 (“Consider how easy it 
would be, relatively speaking, to design an Internet-based currency if the design permitted a party that 
everyone trusts to coordinate its operation: the trusted party would issue the digital money according 
to generally accepted criteria, verify its authenticity, manage its exchange, and so on.”). 
 235. Bayern, supra note 231, at 1489. 
 236. Bryans, supra note 224, at 442–44. 
 237. Abramowicz, supra note 227, at 15–16. 
 238. Id. 
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will recognize an attempted transaction as a fake.239 Nakamoto’s system 
also provides a mechanism for eventually truncating each blockchain 
while maintaining its transactional integrity, thus preventing individual 
Bitcoins from surpassing functional size parameters.240 In sum, Bitcoin’s 
blockchain structure proved that a trusted third-party was not necessary 
for the prevention of duplicate transactions because “decentralized 
software could reliably agree upon a single, authoritative sequence of 
records so that each potential recipient of funds could know that he or 
she is the only recipient of those funds.”241 
While the blockchain technology provides for transactional integrity, 
it does not create the relative scarcity and managed growth necessary for a 
functional money supply.242 The process of “mining” Bitcoins has, to date, 
accomplished both of these goals, while simultaneously creating an 
incentive for decentralized Bitcoin users to provide the computing power 
necessary for the operation of the public leger system. Mining is the 
process by which computers running the Bitcoin software lend their 
processing power to the distributed Bitcoin network to perform the 
complex cryptographic equations to generate new blockchain blocks to 
document Bitcoin transactions in the public register, and to run the 
register itself.243 In exchange for this computing work, owners of the 
individual computers are eventually compensated with newly-minted 
Bitcoins.244 Mining is the only process by which new Bitcoins enter the 
system, and the difficulty of the computing function is automatically 
adjusted by the Bitcoin software to achieve a predetermined rate of 
production of Bitcoins to control for inflation.245 The predetermined rate 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. Nakamoto, supra note 231, at 4 (describing the process for discarding spent transactions to 
conserve disk space). 
 241. Bayern, supra note 231, at 1490. 
 242. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 
65 (1996) (noting that the “scarcity of money, relative to its demand, fixes its value” and that part of 
the Federal Reserve’s charge as to the supply of U.S. dollars is managed growth). 
 243. Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, BITCOIN: A Primer for Policymakers 7 (2013) (“This 
process of mining bitcoins will not continue forever . . . . The arbitrary number chosen to be the cap is 
21 million bitcoins.”). At first blush, twenty-one million may seem like a small number for a currency 
with transnational aspirations, but Bitcoins can be spent fractionally up to eight decimal places. See id. 
(“Miners are projected to painstakingly harvest the last ‘satoshi,’ or 0.00000001 of a bitcoin, in the year 
2140.”). Such fractions are necessary for small purchases given that the exchange value of one Bitcoin 
(denominated “1 BTC”) has ranged from approximately $200 U.S. dollars to $700 U.S. dollars during 
the research and writing of this Article, and Bitcoin has been notoriously volatile at times. See, e.g., 
Bitcoin Price (USD), Coinbase, https://www.coinbase.com/charts?locale=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) 
(charting the price of Bitcoin from its inception to the present day as against U.S. dollars). In any 
event, the ultimate number of separable currency units permitted by Bitcoin is actually 
2,100,000,000,000,000or 2.1 quadrillion, certainly a number allowing for more potential widespread 
distribution and adoption than a mere twenty-one million units. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Grinberg, supra note 229, at 163–64 (describing the declining rate of issuance of Bitcoins 
over time); see also Jonathan B. Turpin, Note, Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global, Virtual 
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at which new Bitcoins are generated is halved approximately every four 
years, and new production will cease once a total of twenty-one million 
Bitcoins are in circulation, roughly the year 2140.246 At that point, miners 
who support the network will be able to charge transaction fees, albeit 
relatively small ones given a larger size of the network and significantly 
greater computing processor power expected under Moore’s law.247 
For present technical purposes, one may fairly assume that Bitcoin 
works; that is, the technology has a track record since 2008 of doing 
precisely what it purports to do. Indeed, the blockchain technology 
behind Bitcoin has proven robust enough to attract the interest of 
mainstream financial institutions, even if outside of its application as 
currency.248 Mainstream commentary has slowly warmed to the concept of 
cryptocurrency and the technology it represents. “Bitcoin’s strength[,]” 
noted a representative of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, “is 
as a decentralized platform that mimics, and improves upon, the 
traditional debit-credit leger function of banks. This virtue is notnot yet, 
anywaymatched by the other virtues of a truly useful money: as a 
medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.”249  
The proponents of Bitcoin may have revolutionary aspirations, but 
Bitcoin as a currency ultimately faces the same problem as any other 
nascent payment systemachieving a critical mass of marketplace 
acceptance.250 Another lingering difficulty for Bitcoin is volatility in its 
value reminiscent of distressed fiat currencies.251 This volatility risk could, 
in turn, further hinder prospects for its acceptance. On the flipside, 
 
Currency Operating in an Unexplored Legal Framework, 21 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 335, 341 
(2014). 
 246. See Turpin, supra note 245, at 341. 
 247. Moore’s Law, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
moore’s%20law (Moore’s law is “an axiom of microprocessor development usually holding that 
processing power doubles about every 18 months especially relative to cost or size.”). Moore’s Law is 
named after and attributed to Intel Corporation co-founder Gordon E. Moore. 
 248. Ian Allison, Codename Citicoin: Banking Giant Built Three Internal Blockchains to Test Bitcoin 
Technology, Int’l Bus. Times (July 1, 2015, 9:56 AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/codename-citicoin- 
banking-giant-built-three-internal-blockchains-test-bitcoin-technology-1508759 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) 
(reporting that Citibank is “talking to governments and regulators . . . [regarding] the potential of either a 
blockchain distributed ledger network . . . or even ‘the opportunity to create state-backed digital 
currency . . . .’”). 
 249. Bret Swanson, Bitcoin, Teenage Travel and the Future of Money, Chicago Tribune (July 17, 
2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/hub/ct-us-chamber-bitcoin-currency-bsi-hub-
20150717-story.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 250. See Grinberg, supra note 229, at 175 (observing that Bitcoin is “susceptible to irrational 
bubbles and also irrational or rational loss of confidence”). 
 251. See Jonathan Todd Barker, Why Is Bitcoin's Value So Volatile?, Investopedia (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/052014/why-bitcoins-value-so-volatile.asp#ixzz3gO19qg2t 
(“Volatility in Bitcoin does not yet have a generally accepted index since cryptocurrency as an asset class 
is still in its nascent stages, but with moves in the past year from around $100 to $1,240 at the peak in 
December 2013 . . . Bitcoin is capable of volatility in the form of 10x changes in price versus the U.S. 
dollar in a relatively short period of time.”). 
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volatilityor potential volatilityof fiat currencies may have provided 
opportunities for Bitcoin expansion in countries in economic crisis, such 
as Greece and Argentina.252 This phenomenon is not confined to basket-
case economies, either. Spikes in Bitcoin’s value reflecting uncertainty 
over the British pound likewise occurred immediately following the 
United Kingdom’s vote for a “Brexit” from the European Union.253  
Regardless of whether Bitcoin itself can achieve acceptance akin to a 
widely accepted currency, the existence of cryptocurrency raises a host of 
legal questions about its categorization. The IRS has issued a determination 
that, for federal tax purposes, virtual currencyincluding Bitcoinis 
property, rather than currency.254 A taxpayer who receives payment in 
virtual currency must thus include “the fair market value of the virtual 
currency” in U.S. dollars on the date of receipt when computing gross 
income.255 In short, a sale of goods or services in exchange for Bitcoins is a 
barter transaction, at least for American tax purposes. While the IRS 
approach is not innately hostile to virtual currency, it could make life 
difficult for end-users who, rather than holding Bitcoins as an 
investment, actually use it as a currency for daily purchases. Bitcoins 
presumably have a tax basis set at their acquisition price in dollars, and 
produce realized income (or loss) at the time they are spent.256 Purchases 
and sales of securities take place in a setting and with an established 
expectation of the need to compute taxable income. But who is equipped 
and who reasonably expects to contemplate taxable income every time 
she purchases groceries or a cup of coffee? “The bottom line is that there 
is not currently an easy mechanism for assessing and collecting taxes on 
virtual currencies.”257 But tax laws, like payment systems, are regularly 
subject to change. 
On another tax front, the European Court of Justice recently 
addressed whether transactions involving the buying and selling of 
 
 252. See, e.g., Jemima Kelly, REFILEFearing Return to Drachma, Some Greeks Use Bitcoin to 
Dodge Capital Controls, Reuters, July 3, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/eurozone-greece-bitcoin- 
idUSL8N0ZG1RZ20150703 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Elliot Maras, Bitcoin Growth More Than 
Doubles in Economically Ravaged Argentina, CCN (July 20, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/ 
bitcoin-growth-doubles-economically-ravaged-argentina/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (suggesting that 
Bitcoin has become an attractive alternative to the Argentine peso); see also Editorial Board, 
Argentina’s Economic Crisis, Wash. Post (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
argentinas-economic-crisis/2014/01/30/a35d1818-878f-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2016). 
 253. See Alexandra Mosher, Bitcoin Surges After Brexit Sinks Pound, USA Today (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/06/24/bitcoin-surges-after-brexit-sinks-pound/86340450/ 
(“The latest gains can be chalked up to a flight to alternative currencies after U.K. voters shocked global 
markets by choosing to leave the European Union.”). 
 254. See Notice 2014–2, IRS (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Hill, supra note 223, at 67. 
 257. Id. 
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Bitcoins are subject to value-added tax (“VAT”) in the EU.258 The 
Advocate General of the Court opined that Bitcoin operations should be 
exempt from the VAT, strengthening the case, at least in Europe, for 
treating virtual currency more like fiat currency.259 Several EU member 
states that have addressed the issue have reached this same conclusion.260 
With tax treatment as personal property and a critical mass of 
investors who hold Bitcoins seeking profit rather than day-to-day use, 
cryptocurrency faces the possibility of being regulated by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).261 The SEC has thus far avoided 
taking a bright line approach, with the SEC Chairman suggesting that 
SEC regulation of virtual currency would be “dependent on the 
particular facts and circumstances at issue,” noting also that “interests 
issued by entities owning virtual currencies or providing returns based on 
assets such as virtual currencies likely would be securities and therefore 
subject to our regulation.”262 Bitcoin may not be a security inherently, but 
the more it is used like one, the more likely it is that the SEC would step in 
to regulate it. Meanwhile, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) has decided that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies fall under 
the definition of “commodity” such that the sale of put and call options on 
cryptocurrency are subject to CFTC regulation under the Commodity 
Exchange Act.263 
Despite these fundamental legal uncertainties, cryptocurrencies 
have thus far avoided being regulated out of existence. In July 2014, New 
York State’s Department of Financial Services proposed substantial 
regulations impacting virtual currency,264 adopting its final rules in June 
 
 258. Bitcoin Should Be Exempt from VAT-Top EU Court Adviser, Reuters (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-bitcoin-tax-idUSL5N0ZW3VF20150716 (“Digital currencies like 
bitcoin should be exempt from value-added tax (VAT), the legal adviser to the European Union’s 
highest court said on Thursday [July 16, 2015], in a case that could set a rule across the bloc.”). 
 259. Yessi Bello Perez, European Court of Justice Official Proposes Bitcoin VAT Exemption, 
CoinDesk (July 16, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/european-court-of-justice-official-proposes- 
bitcoin-vat-exemption/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 260. Id. (listing Sweden, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland as countries not applying the VAT to 
Bitcoin transactions); see Chris Grundy, Why the Future of Bitcoin Lies in Europe, CoinDesk (Sept. 6, 
2015, 12:22 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/why-the-future-of-bitcoin-lies-in-europe/ (last visited Aug. 
5, 2016) (opining that VAT determinations and other aspects of the legal landscape make Europe a 
more attractive market for Bitcoin than the United States). 
 261. Hill, supra note 223, at 68. 
 262. Letter from Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC to the Honorable Thomas R. Carper, Chairman, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Aug. 30, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/VCurrenty111813.pdf; see Hill, supra note 223, at 68. 
 263. Press Release, CFTC Orders Bitcoin Options Trading Platform and Its CEO to Cease 
Illegally Offering Bitcoin Options and to Cease Operating a Facility for Trading or Processing Swaps 
Without Registering, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Sept. 17, 2015) (on file with author), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15. 
 264. Sarah Jane Hughes, Did New York State Just Anoint Virtual Currencies by Proposing to 
Regulate Them, or Will Regulation Spoil Them for Some, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 51, 54–55 (2014). 
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2015. The rules create a “Bitlicense” required for financial intermediaries 
who buy and sell virtual currency on an exchange.265 Notably, these rules 
“would not apply to software developers, individual users, customer 
loyalty programs and gift cards, currency miners, nor to merchants 
accepting [Bitcoin] as a payment.”266 The New York regime thus does not 
regulate end-users and merchants any more than they would be 
regulated in a cash transaction. While this approach does not endorse 
cryptocurrency,267 it certainly avoids end-user inconvenience that could 
retard its development as a viable payment system. 
Despite the technological viability of Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies, the possibility of them being regulated out of practical 
existence as a payment system is quite real over the next several years. 
The reason, ironically enough, is that among digital payment systems, 
cryptocurrency is the one that most effectively replicates cash. The 
features it replicates, however, are those that have traditionally made 
cash attractive for criminal transactions and associated money 
laundering.268 The passage of value in the payment process is virtually 
instantaneous and irreversible. Payment through Bitcoin’s distributed 
leger system, while not completely anonymous, is pseudo-anonymous, 
not leaving behind the easily traceable digital exhaust accompanying 
payments processed through the banking system.269 The most infamous 
criminal use of Bitcoin to date was the Silk Road digital marketplace.270 
Until the arrest of Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht in October 2013, the 
site facilitated illegal drug transactions in the shady and less-readily 
 
 265. Karen Freifeld & Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, New York Regulator Issues Final Bitcoin Rules, 
Reuters (June 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/bitcoin-regulation-new-york-idUSL1N0YP1ES 
20150603. 
 266. Id. 
 267. But see Hughes, supra note 264, at 51 (suggesting that one possible outcome of regulation of 
virtual currency could be its legitimization with a broader spectrum of the general public).  
 268. Nathan M. Crystal, Ethics Watch: Accepting Bitcoin?, SC Lawyer (2014), http://www. 
nathancrystal.com/pdf/ethicswatch_0914.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“The cash-like quality of 
bitcoins means that they are attractive to criminals who want to hide their activities and identities.”); 
Tyler T. Buckner, Rocky Mountain High: The Impact of Federal Guidance to Banks on the Marijuana 
Industry, 19 N.C. Banking Inst. 165, 181 (2015) (“All-cash income streams inevitably attract criminal 
activity . . . .”). 
 269. Jason Luu & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Challenge of Bitcoin Pseudo-Anonymity to Computer 
Forensics, 52 Crim. L. Bulletin Art. 8, nn.51–52 (winter 2016) (“Many commentators in the public, 
media, and policy circles are aware of Bitcoin only from the notorious examples of its misuse by criminals, 
notably the two Silk Road prosecutions. These commentators are impressed by the danger arising from 
Bitcoin’s pseudo-anonymity, which makes it difficult to track financial transactions.” (internal footnotes 
omitted)).  
 270. Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk 
Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 12 (2014) (“Silk Road, described as the ‘Amazon for 
Drugs,’ is perhaps the most significant example of a site reported to have been responsible for major 
sales . . . .”). 
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accessible “dark web” corners of the Internet.271 The cash-like qualities of 
Bitcoin made it the currency of the criminal’s choice on Silk Road. In 
May 2015, Ulbricht was sentenced to life in prison, and the Bitcoins 
seized by federal authorities became subject to civil forfeiture.272 As of 
September 2015, the U.S. Marshals Service was still in the process of 
auctioning off the Bitcoins.273 
While the endorsement by criminal elements is not a welcome one, 
the existence of such attraction to Bitcoin transactions is considerable 
evidence that cryptocurrency has succeeded as a payment system, albeit 
one requiring new creativity on the part of law enforcement. The 
ultimate story of Silk Road, after all, is one where law enforcement 
prevailed over the criminal enterprise. 
A generation ago, an assertion that “the essential function” of all 
noncash payment systems is “to affect a transfer of deposit institution credit 
from a debtor to a creditor” was difficult to dispute.274 Cryptocurrency now 
makes the assertion quite disputable by technology that substantially 
replicates cash and enables removal of depositary institutions and other 
“trusted intermediaries” from the payments mix.275 Mobile payment 
systems like Apple Pay are operatingalbeit not always comfortablyon 
top of the existing law of payments, but Bitcoin and others in the virtual 
currency space have leaped beyond that law. Both streams of 
development, however, represent the breadth of the moving challenge 
facing the law of payments. Where, if anywhere, is the public better 
served by the regulation of payment systems? What should be the source 
of that regulation? Is the legal management of payments an appropriate 
means to achieve policy goals beyond the mere functioning of the 
system? The successes, failures, and developments of the last seventy 
years provide some answers to these questions and show that we need 
not lament the marginalization of public payments law. Instead, we need 
to apply these lessons of the past to identify public law’s role for the 
future. 
 
 271. Bernice B. Donald & N. Chase Teeples, Not Your Father’s Legal Profession: Technology, 
Globalization, Diversity, and the Future of Law Practice in the United States, 44 U. Mem. L. Rev. 645, 
653 (2014) (describing the dark web as “an area of the Internet that regular users cannot access 
without special software or unique information known only to ‘dark Web’ users”). 
 272. See Kate Vinton, Silk Road Creator Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life In Prison, Forbes (May 
29, 2015, 4:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/05/29/ulbricht-sentencing-silk-road/ 
(“In addition to life in prison, Ulbricht also owes the government almost $200 million . . . . The 
$183,961,921 accounts for all illegal drug and fake ID sales in Bitcoin on the Silk Road.”). 
 273. Pete Rizzo, US Marshals: Final Silk Road Bitcoin Auction Likely for 2015, CoinDesk (Sept. 4, 
2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/us-marshals-bitcoin-auction-2015/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 274. Leary, Jr. & Pitcairn, supra note 174, at 914 (emphasis added).  
 275. Nakamoto, supra note 231, at 1–3. 
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IV.  A Path Forward for Payments Law 
Payments law historyright up to its most recent developmentshas 
much to teach about systemic competencies for public law and private law 
in fields of rapid technological innovation. Areas traditionally thought to 
require the treatment of a comprehensive code can have innovation stifled 
by such treatment. This Article does not seek to criticize public 
regulatory law as such, but it instead calls for recognition of public law’s 
limits. “Efforts to create a unified body of law for all payment systems 
have so far been unsuccessful.”276 The role of private contract law has 
expanded to fill the vacuum. This Article suggests that the lack of 
successes in answering past calls for creating unified and comprehensive 
regulation277 has, albeit unintentionally, been a good thing for payments. 
We know what works, and can accordingly apply the lessons of 
experience. The most beneficial paradigm for governance of payment 
systems going forward is a division between (1) private law and public-
private partnerships that handle systemic matters of operation, and (2) 
public law focused on protecting payment system end-users from 
oppression, fraud, and mistake. Such an allocation of legal responsibilities 
is most capable of dealing with a foreseeable future of paymentsa future 
that includes unforeseeable innovations. Accordingly, this Part of the 
Article explores features of that allocation. 
A. The Divide Between Public Law and Private Law 
The default mechanism for governing payment systems should be 
private contract law, a category that for present purposes includes the 
output of public-private partnerships, such as the operating rules of 
NACHA. Put differently, public law should presumptively not be the 
governing device for payments, although the presumption is a rebuttable 
one. Indeed, and as shown below, the private law presumption certainly 
is rebutted in some specific instances, particularly regarding end-user 
protection.278 Setting aside those exceptions, however, raises the question 
of why private law is worthy of such a presumption. Experience provides 
three interrelated reasons to err on the side of private governance. First, 
private law is more capable of adapting to technological change in a 
meaningful timeframe. Second, after bright-line public law protections of 
system users are in place, the remaining incentives will be for system 
operators to conduct themselves in a manner that produces the most 
social benefit. Finally, the parties operating a payment system are in the 
 
 276. Rogers, supra note 17, at xiv. 
 277. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 171, at 89 (arguing at the time of consideration of the New Payments 
Code that “only a ‘true code’ . . . will improve payments law. To achieve that goal a payments code must 
be comprehensive; that is, it must be pervasive in scope, codifying the general law of payments systems, 
paper-based as well as electronic.”). 
 278. See infra Part IV.B. 
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best position to determine allocation of risks unaccounted for by limited 
public law, and also to handle a limited collection of risks that public law 
should impose. 
The first reason for a general preference of private contract law is 
that the public legislative or regulatory process is not nimble enough to 
keep up with the times. That fact is not a design flaw in deliberative 
democracy; it is an intentional feature where the intention dates at least 
as far back as the U.S. Constitution.279 Obtaining passage of legislation in 
Congress is a difficult proposition in most cases, and speed is a rarity, 
particularly in the absence of a national emergency. For even the most 
admirable work of the Uniform Law Commission (“Commission”), the 
enactment goal is multiplied times fifty statesplus U.S. territories.280 Such 
deliberative processes are a benefit and result in greater stakeholder 
inclusion. The operational side of payment systems, however, suffers from 
the worst in such a process. Beyond the end-user experiences, there is little 
public interest apart from the operators in the system.  
The complexities of enactment would not be an overwhelming 
problem in the one-time or once-a-generation affair that describes much 
public legislation. An area of rapid technological advancement, in 
contrast, requires frequent updates to micro-level rules of system 
operation. That requires returning to the legislative well more often than 
is realistically feasible, given the transaction costs. Moreover, these 
frequent appeals have diminishing returns concomitant to the 
diminishing political interest. MasterCard and Visa can change their 
operational rules with considerably less effort. Even an association like 
NACHA, with its vast membership and deliberative notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process, is capable of turning out rule updates on an annual 
basis. Public law cannot compete here. Absent a matter of public 
concern, efficiency weighs heavily in favor of private law in a field of 
swift technological changes, as is the case with developing electronic 
payment systems. 
Private law is also presumptively the superior regulatory system 
because system operators are, assuming a baseline of general legal 
protections against oppression of end-users, naturally incentivized to 
conduct themselves in a manner tending toward the most efficient 
system. Both the payment card systems and the ACH system suggest this 
result based upon decades of growth (at least as to consumers) within 
bright-line protective regimes under TILA and the EFTA. Ironically, this 
lesson of commercial law history is analogous to Karl Llewellyn’s claim 
 
 279. Cf. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). 
 280. See generally About the ULC, Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, http:// 
uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%the%20ULC (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“The state 
uniform law commissioners come together as the Uniform Law Commission for one purposeto 
study and review the law of the states to determine which areas of law should be uniform.”). 
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about the impact of trade association rules. The leading architect of UCC 
regulation claimed that “trade association rules are presumptively 
efficient when all affected parties participate in creating the rules.”281 
Llewellyn believed, however, that the limits of the desirability of trade 
association self-governance were reached when they dealt with the 
unorganized public. At that point, “they engage in exploitation,” and 
their rules “no longer deserve the presumption of desirability.”282 Put in 
the payment systems context, this concept means that the commercial 
actors should be trusted to run their own affairsprovided that the law 
prevents the actors from exploiting the public, hence the public law 
aspect of this framework described in the next Part. 
The third of these interrelated reasons for the presumptive 
deference to private contract law is because of the superior information 
position held by stakeholders in technologically developing payment 
systems. Simply put, the system players are in the best position to know 
what works. NACHA and its members, for example, are in the best 
position to decide when same-day ACH transactions are financially and 
technologically feasible. Credit card network owners, for example, have 
the most technical ability to process payments over their networks. 
Operating stakeholders in any technologically advanced payment system 
have the best knowledge to prevent fraudulent abuses of their system. 
Targeted public law need only protect end-users from fraud and mistake 
by shifting the risk of loss to the party operating the technology. At that 
point, the means of prevention should shift to the operator unless and 
until the means are harming the public. 
Accepting a presumptive role of private governance of payment 
systems, the question arises as to when rebuttal of the presumption is 
appropriate. The short-but-unhelpful answer is that the presumption may 
be rebutted whenever society benefits by doing so. One longer and more 
helpful answer is this: With operational systems issues in the hands of 
contract law and private consortia operating in a public-private 
partnership, the remaining principal matter of public concern is protection 
of the end-users of payment systemsindividuals and small businesses 
that do not have the leverage or the expertise to protect themselves from 
oppression, fraud, and mistake in the various payment networks. End-user 
protection should be the principal focus of public payments law because 
that is the area where systemic and market incentives will not, standing 
alone, tend to reach the most societally desirable result while facing the 
challenge of achieving a critical mass in the payments marketplace. 
 
 281. Alan Schwartz, The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures, 62 La. L. Rev. 1147, 1151 
(2002) (describing Llewellyn’s position). 
 282. Id. 
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The assertion that market forces will retard technological innovations 
achieving critical mass in the marketplace sounds counterintuitive, but 
history suggests it to be true. Credit card systems existed before they were 
subject to the bright-line TILA fifty dollar limit for consumer losses due 
to unauthorized use, yet the full flourishing and consumer acceptance of 
the credit card payment mechanism did not occur until afterward. Why? 
An important part of the answer is the across-the-board fifty dollar loss 
limit. It was easy to communicate as an assurance to potential credit card 
customers, and the confidence of customers was bolstered by the legally 
mandated lack of deviation from the bright-line rule. No single outlier 
could generate a persistent stream of unauthorized-use horror stories 
that would have the effect of retarding the entire market for adoption of 
and habitual use of a then-unfamiliar payment system.283 Credit card 
payments became ubiquitous in part because a user-protective legal 
environment facilitated their being so. Debit cards and consumer use 
markets for ACH payments (like online bill pay) have similarly 
benefitted from the user protections of the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act. User protections, rather than operational rules, must be the focus of 
public payments law. Indeed, decades of payment systems development 
teaches usrather surprisinglythat payment innovators should want 
some level of bright-line and user-protective public law because those 
protections stimulate marketplace acceptance. 
If one accepts, as this Article does, the propriety and advisability of 
a division between matters of private concern and matters of public 
concern in payments law, a question necessarily arises whether public 
law should be enacted at the state or federal level. Given the past 
accomplishments of the UCC and its drafters,284 uniform state law would 
generally be an attractive option. In fact, as of the time of publication of 
this Article, the Commission is in the process of drafting a uniform act 
governing virtual currency businesses.285 History suggests, however, that 
taking on a role involving user protection will be a formidable challenge. 
From the New Payments Code project of the 1970s and 1980s286 to the 
Article 2 revision project of the 1990s and 2000s,287 the veto of opponents 
 
 283. See Winn, supra note 120, at 709 (“Consumers may migrate toward regulated systems because 
they provide these incidental benefits without regard to how well systemic risk issues are managed.”). 
 284. See generally Stein, supra note 36 (detailing accomplishments in the uniform laws drafting 
process over the preceding 120 years). 
 285. See Frederick H. Miller & Sarah Jane Hughes, Final Study Committee on Alternative 
and Mobile Payment Systems Report 1–2 (2014) (recommending expedited development of a 
uniform act regulating certain aspects of virtual currencies). 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 150–183. 
 287. See generally William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 Duq. Bus. L.J. 
131 (2009) (exploring the problems likely to arise as a result of amended Article 2); Fred H. Miller, 
What Can We Learn from the Failed 2003–2005 Amendments to UCC Article 2?, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 471 
(2011) (discussing the failure of UCC Article 2 amendments). 
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of protective legislation has been consistently effective. The UCC 
revision process in particular can be the graveyard where consumer 
protection initiatives go to die, and that challenge would have to be 
overcome to enact appropriate protective legislation. The idea of 
establishing consumer protective legislation through the UCC payment 
articles has even been called a “fantasy” for academics arising from (pun 
thoroughly intended) “substance abuse.”288 The current effort by the 
Commission does not involve the UCC, however. Moreover, players in 
the nascent realm of cryptocurrencies in particular have incentive to 
support some level of user protection legislation.289 Protection creates an 
environment for widespread market acceptance, as the credit card 
industry can attest. 
Moreover, an additional incentive exists for savvy players in the 
payments industry to be amenable to action by the Commission and 
proposals like the Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ (“CSBS”) 
Model Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Activities, discussed 
below. The alternative to uniform state law is far-reachingand perhaps 
overreachingregulation by the federal Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”). The CFPB has suggested that it is poised to act in the 
area of emerging payment systems.290 The technology and financial 
sectors might have an incentive to work out bright-line protections for 
payment end-users from oppression, fraud, and mistake, unlike in the 
1970s and 1980s. The incentives to participating in the process are thus 
both positive and negative. The positive incentive is to create a legal 
environment that facilitates broad market acceptance of new payment 
technologies; the negative incentive is to avoid innovation-retarding 
over-regulation. 
With this public-private dividing line in mind, and having set forth 
reasons why public protection law for payment systems users could be 
more successful now than in the past, we turn to application. How would 
we evaluate regulatory proposals in light of the public-private divide? 
This Subpart of the Article will use proposals from the federal CFPB and 
from the CSBS to illustrate. Numerous other proposals are out there, to 
be sure, including individual state legislation and the Commission’s 
pending virtual currency project. The two evaluated here are sufficiently 
representative for present purposes: The CFPB effort implicates federal 
 
 288. Norman I. Silber, Substance Abuse at UCC Drafting Sessions, 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 225, 239 (1997) 
(describing this outcome as “the most preposterous” of three improbable UCC-drafting fantasies). 
 289. See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh & Jerry Brito, State Digital Currency Principles and 
Framework: Version 1.3 4 (2015) (acknowledging that trusted digital currency intermediaries “so long as 
they walk and quack like a money transmitting duck, offer the same case for regulation as traditional 
financial services” but that such regulations should not retard innovation).  
 290. See generally Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Protection Principles: CFPB’s 
Vision of Consumer Protection in New Faster Payment Systems (2015) (describing new CFPB 
protection principles in light of new payment systems). 
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law and the mobile payments strand of innovation along with other 
payments built on existing system rails; the CSBS framework, in contrast, 
specifically implicates state law and the cryptocurrency strand of 
innovation. 
B. Applying the Divide: The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau 
The federal CFPB was created under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, and 
as its name suggests, the agency is focused on protection of consumers 
specifically, rather than payment systems users more broadly, such as 
small businesses. Coinciding with the eve of implementation of same-day 
ACH payments, the CFPB released “CFPB’s Vision of Consumer 
Protection in New Faster Payment Systems,” a list of nine “Principles” 
for future system development.291 The CFPB’s aspirational “vision” does 
not have the force of law, nor does it seek to micromanage or displace 
the private players in banking. The CFPB is “not specifying” how the 
Principles “must be achieved,” but instead recognizes “that a variety of 
system components, including system architecture, operator covenants 
and warranties, requirements for participants and intermediaries, rules, 
and other mechanisms” are a critical part of “providing consumer 
protection, utility, and value.”292 The Principles do, however, represent a 
potential path for federal regulation of payments. 
The Principles do not precisely coincide with the categories of 
oppression, fraud, and mistake advocated in this Article, but many of the 
Principles fit within them. In brief paraphrase,293 the CFPB Principles are: 
(1) Consumer Control over Payments. Payment consumers should 
have clear control over when, how, and under what terms the 
consumer has authorized a payment. 
(2) Data and Privacy. Consumers should be informed how their data 
are being transferred and used, and systems should prevent misuse of 
the data. 
(3) Fraud and Error Resolution Protections. Payment systems should 
protect consumers against mistaken, fraudulent, and unauthorized, or 
otherwise erroneous transactions.294 
(4) Transparency. Payment systems should be transparent to 
consumers, including disclosure of costs, risks, funds availability, and 
security of payments; and should also include real-time access to the 
status of transactions. 
 
 291.  Id. 
 292. Id.  
 293. The bold titles in this list are the exact titles used by the CFPB. For brevity’s sake, the text following 
each title is the Author’s paraphrase of the CFPB’s description of each applicable principle. 
 294. Under this third item, the CFPB cites Regulation E (electronic fund transfers) and Regulation 
Z (credit card payments) as examples of “appropriate safeguards” now existing. See Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau, supra note 290.  
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(5) Cost. Payment systems should be affordable, using fee structures 
that do not obscure the full cost of making a payment. 
(6) Access. Payment systems should be broadly accessible to 
consumers and widely accepted by businesses and other consumers. 
(7) Funds Availability. Faster payment systems should promote faster 
guaranteed access to funds by consumers, not only to financial 
institutions and merchants. 
(8) Security and Payment Credential Value. Payment systems should 
include strong security and a limitation on the value of consumer 
payment credentials, minimizing the worth of such credentials to 
fraudsters. 
(9) Strong Accountability Mechanisms that Effectively Curtail System 
Misuse. The mechanisms of any faster payment system should 
collectively incentivize operators, participants, and end-users against 
misuse of the system.295 
The CFPB Principles provide a useful framework for further 
discussion of the best role for public law in future governance of payment 
systems, regardless of whether the CFPB is the appropriate agency to 
handle such matters. Because this Article calls for a robust, but tightly 
limited protective regime for end-users, the CFPB Principles are a good 
vehicle for evaluating protection goals that, given the agency mandate, 
will tend to err on the side of more regulation. For present purposes, the 
CFPB Principles fall generally into three categories: (1) those where 
protective regulation is inadvisable or unnecessary due to existing market 
incentives; (2) those where protective regulation is arguably useful due to 
conflicting market incentives; and (3) those where protective regulation 
should be a priority because of the clear public benefit of legally protecting 
users from oppression, fraud, and mistake. 
The first category of Principles are those where regulation is either 
unnecessary or ill-advised. Items six, eight, and nine above (high access, 
credential security, and accountability against misuse) are outcomes that, 
at least in centralized private payment networks, are likely adequately 
protected by the impact of market forces on the private sector. On these 
points, federal regulation is not only unnecessary, but would lag painfully 
behind fast-developing technology. A payment mechanism with limited 
market access or that has poor security and is susceptible to in-the-
system misuse would ultimately not survive in the face of a viable market 
alternative. In the case of cryptocurrency, these classes of protections are 
actually off-point, just as they would be for payment in cash itself. The 
intended cash-usability of Bitcoin and the like are a feature of its design. 
The second category is a mixed bag, raising issues that could be 
appropriate for public law protection, but are not necessarily so absent 
evidence of end-user protection through a given payment system. Items 
 
 295. See id. 
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two and seven (data privacy and faster funds availability) face both 
encouragement and discouragement incentives in the private market. 
While some end-users will be drawn to, and place a premium on, 
personal privacy and expedited funds availability, payment system 
providers have financial incentives to mine and repackage user data for 
sale and to gain float time off aggregated withheld funds.296 Both end-
user privacy and faster funds availability are significant concerns and 
raise the potential for abuses, but they are also matters where consumer 
choice should ultimately prevail over the risks of abuse. In particular, the 
privacy of customer data has become a selling point for both merchants 
and payment providers.297 Though not centrally marketed, Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrency do tend to be touted as an alternative for their 
transactional privacya quality which has been of public concern to law 
enforcement.298 For all developing payment systems, items two and seven 
on the CFPB list are thus potential points of regulation, but are now 
better left alone as the market may solve these problems most 
effectively. If that does not happen, public law regulation looms nearby. 
The core matters of end-user protection where public law protecting 
the end-user is called for is under items one, three, four, and five, dealing 
respectively with unauthorized payments, fraudulent or erroneous 
payments, and, taking four and five together, clear disclosure of system 
costs and user-relevant operations (such as funds availability). These are 
areas where, despite the regulatory cost, payment systems innovation 
would be encouraged by bright-line protective legislation that fosters 
confidence in emerging payment systems. The goal here is to facilitate 
duplication of the successes of the payments card industry under TILA 
and EFTA. Such legislation could come at the state level, but the 
CFPBand the risk of over-regulationstands waiting in the wings if it 
does not. 
 
 296. See generally Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS News 
60 Minutes (Aug. 24, 2014) (describing the resale value of personal information); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 237, 
247 (1992) (describing how holders of payment funds “enjoy the benefit of the float between the time 
the instrument is issued and the time of payment”). 
 297. See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, Amazon’s Pitch to Europe: Your Data Is Safe from American Spies, 
Bloomberg Bus., Jan. 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-07/amazon-s-pitch-to-
europe-your-data-is-safe-from-american-spies; Apple’s Commitment to Your Privacy, Apple, http:// 
www.apple.com/privacy/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“At Apple, your trust means everything to us. That’s 
why we respect your privacy and protect it with strong encryption, plus strict policies that govern how all 
data is handled.”). 
 298. See, e.g., Evan Perez, Holder: Bitcoin Raises Law Enforcement Concerns, CNN Money (Apr. 
8, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/08/technology/bitcoin-holder/ (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016) (describing Congressional testimony by then-Attorney General, Eric Holder, about Justice 
Department concerns with “bad actors who use digital currencies to buy drugs, weapons, and other 
illegal goods and services.”). 
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C. Applying the Divide: The Conference of State Bank Supervisors 
At the state level, a significant effort to guide regulatory efforts 
regarding licensure and supervision of activities in the cryptocurrency 
stream of payments innovationunder the name of “virtual currency” in 
this instancehas come from the CSBS. The CSBS is a nationwide 
organization of financial regulators from all fifty states and certain U.S. 
territories dating back to 1902.299 The stated mission of the CSBS is to 
support state regulators “in advancing the system of state financial 
supervision by ensuring safety, soundness and consumer protection; 
promoting economic growth; and fostering innovative, responsive 
supervision.”300 Coming from a state regulator perspective, the CSBS 
formed an Emerging Payments Task Force “to identify areas for 
consistent regulatory approaches among the states” with regard to 
developing payment systems.301 The task force concluded that “activities 
involving third party control of virtual currency, including for the 
purposes of transmitting, exchanging, holding, or otherwise controlling 
virtual currency” should be regulated at the state level.302 The eventual 
product arising from this conclusion is a Model Regulatory Framework 
released by the CSBS on September 15, 2015 (“CSBS Framework”).303 
The Frameworkunsurprisingly, given its sourcefocuses on payment 
intermediaries in many areas associated with the safety-and-soundness 
and anti-money laundering regulation of banks.304 As this Article is 
focused on the governance of payment systems as such, its review of the 
CSBS Framework will be restricted accordingly, with one exception. 
The banking-style focus of the CSBS Framework is noteworthy 
because it is representative of the state law responses to Bitcoin. The 
Framework is less interested in the operation of cryptocurrencies as 
payment systems than it is in the licensure of intermediaries “involved in 
third party control of virtual currency.”305 The same can also be said of 
the finalized New York “Bitlicense” regulations and, as of this writing, of 
the pending Uniform Law Commission project to regulate virtual 
 
 299. See About the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 
https://www.csbs.org/about/what/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Regulatory Requirements for Virtual 
Currency Activities: CSBS Model Regulatory Framework 1 (2015).  
 302. Id.  
 303. Id.  
 304. See, e.g., id. at 12–13 (including “Licensing Requirements,” “Financial Strength and Stability,” 
and “Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering” regulation as components of the CSBS Framework). 
While these are certainly important topics, they are beyond the payments-focus of this Article, just as 
general banking regulation was beyond the scope of earlier discussions of checks and credit cards.  
 305. Id. at 11.  
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currency businesses.306 This Article asserts that decades of payments law 
experience shows that a comprehensive code would not be a productive 
approach for governance of an emerging payment system. The CSBS 
Framework is, in that regard, consistent with this Article. 
The “Consumer Protection” branch of the CSBS Framework, 
however, is heavy on information gathering while light on specific 
protections that facilitated success of the credit and debit card systems. 
The Framework recommends, in outline form: 
(1)Required consumer protection of policies and documentation of 
such policies; 
(2) Holding an actual amount of virtual currency in trust for customers 
and ensuring that amount is identifiable separately from any other 
customer or virtual currency business entity holdings; 
(3) Required policies and documentation of complaints and error 
resolution; 
(4) Required receipt to consumers with disclosures regarding exchange 
rates; 
(5) Required disclosures to consumers about risks that are particular to 
virtual currency; 
(6) Required disclosure of virtual currency insurance coverage, which 
at a minimum includes notice that virtual currency is not insured or 
otherwise guaranteed against loss by any government agency; and 
(7) Public disclosure of licensing information and agency contact 
information.307 
Consumer protection items in the Framework are generally divisible 
into two categories: documentation and disclosure. As for documentation, 
items (1) and (3) in the Framework encourage states to mandate that 
regulated virtual currency businesses keep consumer protection policies, 
including policies on the critical payment systems issue of error resolution. 
They do not, however, specify any scope of the policies, but merely that 
they be reduced to “documentation.” Item (2) suggests the need for bank-
account-like records that separately identify virtual currency that is “held” 
for customers. This requirement, while well-intentioned, is problematic in 
its inconsistency with the actual technology used in the transmittal of 
value represented by virtual currency. Bitcoin policy advocates Peter 
Van Valkenburgh and Jerry Brito have explained this disconnect 
between concepts of traditional money and its newer digital cousin: 
  
 
 306. See generally Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Project Description for the 
Regulation of Virtual Currencies Act: Drafting Committee Meeting (Oct. 9–11, 2015) (describing the 
scope of the Commission drafting project and providing additional resources). 
 307. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 301, at 13.  
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Digital or “virtual” currency is not, by definition, something that is 
capable of being held in the literal sense. Moreover, while we talk of 
“storing” digital files, perhaps in a cloud service like Dropbox, we 
cannot talk of storing Bitcoins. Bitcoins are not files; they are 
assignments of value made to pseudonymous addresses and listed on a 
public ledger called the blockchain. No one holds or stores bitcoins; 
one holds or stores the cryptographic keys that grants one permission 
on the network to sign for transactions involving particular addresses. 
To the extent anyone ever holds or stores, or simply has bitcoins, it will 
be because they have control over these cryptographic keys.308 
In any event, when a regulated non-owner of Bitcoins has the 
capability of spending them unilaterally,309 the protection contemplated in 
item (2) may need to be framed around the generation of monthly account 
statements, akin to those associated with checking and credit card 
accounts.310 Item (4) addresses both documentation and disclosure, with 
the documentation being the required issuance of a “receipt” (which could 
be digital) for a cryptocurrency transmission between an intermediary and 
its customer. 
The heavy reliance on disclosures contained in items (4) through (7) 
is of concern. This is because excessive disclosure risks are overwhelming 
and thus ineffective, with the disclosure costs not outweighed by measurable 
benefits.311 The result truly could be, in the words of Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Carl Schneider, “more than you wanted to know.”312 The category of “risks 
that are particular to virtual currency” seems particularly vague and over-
inclusive. Some disclosureslike the fact that virtual currency businesses 
offer no protection analogous to that provided by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation for bank accountscould nonetheless be made as 
easily digestible oneliners.313 The CSBS Framework has already been 
criticized for vagueness that could cover unintended parties and hinder 
innovation in the cryptocurrency arena.314 
 
 308. Van Valkenburgh & Brito, supra note 289, at 6 n.21. 
 309. Id. at 7 (advocating the characteristic of unilateral control over digital currency transmission 
as the appropriate trigger for consumer protection legislation). 
 310. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (allocating bank and customer 
responsibilities for fraud and error monitoring where the bank issues a statement of account to its 
customer). 
 311. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost-Benefit Analysis in 
Financial Disclosure Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. S253 (2014) (asserting that consumer disclosure 
laws do not deliver their anticipated benefits).  
 312. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure 
of Mandated Disclosure (2014) (describing and documenting supporting research on the 
ineffectiveness of excessive mandated disclosure). 
 313. Jeremy Papp, A Medium of Exchange for an Internet Age: How to Regulate Bitcoin for the 
Growth of E-Commerce, 15 U. Pitt. J. Tech. L. Pol’y 33, 39 (2014) (observing that Bitcoin exchanges 
create “a credit risk similar to depositing money into a bank account, only without the government 
protection of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).”). 
 314. See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh, Freshly Unveiled CSBS Model Regs: Good Goals, Poor 
Execution, Coin Center (Sept. 15, 2015), https://coincenter.org/2015/09/freshly-unveiled-csbs-model-regs- 
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Of particular interest here is what the CSBS Framework does not 
contain. The CFPB Principles point in a direction that too readily 
exceeds bright-line protection of system users against oppression, fraud, 
and mistake. The CSBS Framework, in contrast, is too amorphous and 
hesitant, focused on disclosure and documentation. The end-users of 
emerging payment systems would benefit from a middle ground. The 
system proponents would as well. That, if anything, is the legal lesson 
from the success of credit cards and debit cards. That lesson speaks to 
payments law going forward. 
Experience with public law governing older payment systems also 
aids in identifying what aspects belong in the future of payments and 
what should fade. Consumer use of the ACH system is subject to the 
EFTA and Regulation E, but those protections should be extended to all 
users. Such a bright-line rule is not prevented by “any inherent 
technological limitation on the ACH system.”315 An example of existing 
end-user protection that is outside the framework proposed here is the 
ability to withhold payment on a credit card. That should not be 
replicated as it is not a protection against problems in the payments 
system. Regulating payments is not an appropriate way to shift (on an 
inconsistent basis, no less) the balance of power between merchants and 
their consumers. Legal protections in payment systems should relate to 
the payment process, not the underlying transaction. 
Experience with technological development further suggests rules 
from the checking system that ought not to be duplicated in the future. 
Technology, coinciding with the Expedited Funds Availability Act,316 has 
made payment “float”a delay in the actual debit of a payment that is 
most frequently associated with checkssomething that should not be 
treated as a right. Another aspect of the checking process that should fall 
by the wayside in an era of faster payments is the stop payment right, 
which is inconsistent with technology that replicates the expediency of 
cash. 
Taken as a whole, our decades of experience with the decline of the 
checking system and the rise of other systems should inform our 
payments policy decisions. Both the CFPB approach and the CSBS 
approach have some merit, but neitherfrom the standpoint of 
payments governancehits the sweet spot. Protecting users outside of 
the payment system from oppression, fraud, and mistakeall of which 
can occur inside the payment systemis an important public law 
 
good-goals-poor-execution/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“Who needs to be licensed? Who should state 
regulators worry about? None of this is made any clearer by the work unveiled by the CSBS today, 
andindeedthe suggestion that mere facilitation of transmission gives rise to an obligation to 
license only muddies these already cloudy waters.”). 
 315. Hal S. Scott, The Importance of the Retail Payment System 36 (2014).  
 316. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–10 (West 2012). 
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function. Most other operational concerns are appropriately left to 
private contract law. At a minimum, private law deserves the 
presumption of primacy for system operations until clear circumstances 
show otherwise. 
Conclusion 
A code, as Robert Scott has defined it, is “a preemptive, systematic, 
and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law” that, by design, 
“purports to give the answers to all relevant questions” in its field.317 
Decades of experience suggest that a public law code, whether at the 
state or federal level, is not a desirable mechanism for governing the 
operational side of payment systems in an era of rapidly advancing 
technology. The field of payments needs legal protections for end-users 
against oppression, fraud, and mistake. It does not need a comprehensive 
code. Indeed, to the extent that our existing codes in UCC Articles 3 and 
4 are intended to facilitate payment transaction processes, we could 
easily live without them.318 Present developments certainly do not call for 
replicating them. 
Payment card networks and the ACH systems have, by their 
massive marketplace successes, shown the potential of largely private law 
governance atop targeted public-protective law. Two major strands of 
current innovation in payments represent different challenges for legal 
structures of payment systems. The Apple Pay exemplar of mobile 
payments illustrates the problems of integration of a new payment 
system into a pre-existing public law framework. The Bitcoin exemplar 
of cryptocurrency shows the establishment of a system that completely 
bypasses the previously unavoidable role of the banking system as the 
trusted intermediary for noncash payments. The overarching challenge 
under these circumstances is to define the most socially beneficial roles 
to assign to public law and private law, respectively.  
The public law of payments is best limited to the prevention of 
oppression, fraud, and mistake victimizing system end-users, yet public 
law should be robust in those arenas. Beyond protection of end-users, 
private contract law has proven itself to be a superior method of 
governance in payment card and ACH transactions. This facilitation of 
private ordering should aid development of non-fiat currencies, as well. 
 The need to address constantly evolving technology requires an 
approach where matters of minimal public concern can be dealt with 
through private law, while public law can govern with respect to matters 
 
 317. Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common 
Law and Code Methodologies, in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 
171 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000). 
 318. Rasmussen, supra note 198, at 1146 (“We could easily live without Articles 3 and 4.”). 
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of public concernprotecting the public from oppression, fraud, and 
mistake. This framework maximizes the benefits of private lawmaking in 
its area of strongest institutional competence, while assigning to public 
law the task of protection of end-users who have comparatively little 
protective and bargaining power. 
Centuries of noncash systems of payment are, in a sense, 
approaching full circle. The inland bill of exchange that Lord Mansfield 
held to be negotiable was a creature of private ordering, not government 
design. The English Bills of Exchange Act, the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Law, and ultimately UCC Articles 3 and 4 were all a result 
of decisions to take a private practice and subject it to comprehensive 
public law regulation. That era is coming to a close in the law of 
payments. Future payments law will, as befitting its origins, best be 
primarily the result of private ordering, with bright-line public law 
protections for end-users preventing the rougher edges of earlier eras. 
We are by no means doomed to repeat the history of payments law, but 
we would do well to take heed of its lessons in this age of emerging 
payments. 
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